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Abstract
Thanks to the wide range of features offered by web browsers, modern
websites include various types of content such as JavaScript and Cascading
Style Sheets (CSS) in order to create interactive user interfaces. Browser
vendors also provided extensions to enhance web browsers with additional
useful capabilities that are not necessarily maintained or supported by default.
However, included content can introduce security risks to users of these
websites, unbeknownst to both website operators and users. In addition, the
browser’s interpretation of the resource URLs may be very different from how
the web server resolves the URL to determine which resource should be re-
turned to the browser. The URL may not correspond to an actual server-side
file system structure at all, or the web server may internally rewrite parts of
the URL. This semantic disconnect between web browsers and web servers in
interpreting relative paths (path confusion) could be exploited by Relative Path
Overwrite (RPO). On the other hand, even tough extensions provide useful
additional functionality for web browsers, they are also an increasingly popular
vector for attacks. Due to the high degree of privilege extensions can hold, ex-
tensions have been abused to inject advertisements into web pages that divert
revenue from content publishers and potentially expose users to malware.
In this thesis, I propose novel research into understanding and mitigating
the security risks of content inclusion in web browsers to protect website pub-
lishers as well as their users. First, I introduce an in-browser approach called
Excision to automatically detect and block malicious third-party content in-
clusions as web pages are loaded into the user’s browser or during the execu-
tion of browser extensions. Then, I propose OriginTracer, an in-browser
approach to highlight extension-based content modification of web pages. Fi-
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nally, I present the first in-depth study of style injection vulnerability using
RPO and discuss potential countermeasures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Linking to the web content has been one of the defining features of the World Wide
Web since its inception, and this feature remains strongly evident today. For instance,
recent research [91] reveals that more than 93% of the most popular websites include
JavaScript from external sources. Developers typically include third-party content
for convenience and performance – e.g., many JavaScript libraries are hosted on fast
content delivery networks (CDNs) and are likely to already be cached by users – or to
integrate with advertising networks, analytics frameworks, and social media. Content
inclusion has also been used by entities other than the website publishers themselves.
For example, ad injection has been adopted by ISPs and browser extension authors as
a prominent technique for monetization [82]. Browser extensions enhance browsers
with additional useful capabilities that are not necessarily maintained or supported
by the browser vendor. Instead, this code is typically written by third parties and
can perform a wide range of tasks, from simple changes in the appearance of web
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pages to sophisticated tasks such as fine-grained filtering of content. To achieve these
capabilities, browser extensions possess more privilege than other third-party code
that runs in the browser. For instance, extensions can access cross-domain content,
and perform network requests that are not subject to the same origin policy.
However, the inherent feature of content-sharing on the Web is also an Achilles
heel when it comes to security. Advertising networks, as one example, have emerged
as an important vector for adversaries to distribute attacks to a wide audience [71, 72,
92, 114, 130]. Moreover, users are more susceptible to malvertising in the presence of
ad injection [54, 117, 127]. In general, linking to third-party content is essentially an
assertion of trust that the content is benign. This assertion can be violated in several
ways, however, due to the dynamic nature of the Web. Since website operators cannot
control external content, they cannot know a priori what links will resolve to in the
future. The compromise of linked content or pure malfeasance on the part of third
parties can easily violate these trust assumptions. This is only exacerbated by the
transitive nature of trust on the Web, where requests for content can be forwarded
beyond the first, directly observable origin to unknown parties.
Furthermore, since extensive capabilities of browser extensions allow a compar-
atively greater degree of control over the browser, they provide a unique opportunity
to attack users and their data, the underlying system, and even the Internet at large.
For this reason, newer browser extension frameworks such as Chromium’s have in-
tegrated least privilege separation via isolated worlds and a fine-grained permissions
system to restrict the capabilities of third-party extensions [15]. However, extension
security frameworks are not a panacea. In practice, their effectiveness is degraded by
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over-privilege and a lack of understanding of the threats posed by highly-privileged
extensions on the part of users [34]. Indeed, despite the existence of extension se-
curity frameworks, it has recently been shown that extension-based advertisement
injection has become a popular and lucrative technique for dishonest parties to mon-
etize user web browsing. These extensions simply inject or replace ads in web pages
when users visit a website, thus creating or diverting an existing revenue stream to
the third party. Users often are not aware of these incidents and, even if this behavior
is noticed, it can be difficult to identify the responsible party.
Web browsers also load internal resources using either absolute URLs or relative
ones. Before a web browser can issue a request for such a resource to the server,
it must expand the relative path into an absolute URL. Web browsers basically
treat URLs as file system-like paths. However, the browser’s interpretation of the
URL may be very different from how the web server resolves the URL to determine
which resource should be returned to the browser. The URL may not correspond
to an actual server-side file system structure at all, or the web server may internally
rewrite parts of the URL. This semantic disconnect between web browsers and web
servers in interpreting relative paths (path confusion) could be exploited by Relative
Path Overwrite (RPO). When an injection vulnerability is present in a page, an
attacker could manipulate the URL such that the web page references itself as the
stylesheet, which turns a simple text injection vulnerability into a style sink [50]. The
general threat model of RPO resembles that of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Typically,
the attacker’s goal is to steal sensitive information from a third-party site or make
unauthorized transactions on the site, such as gaining access to confidential financial
12
information or transferring money out of a victim’s account.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
Due to the increasing reliance of users on web browsers for day to day activities, I
believe it is important to characterize the extent of security risks of content inclusion
on the Web. In this thesis, I investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of novel
approaches to measure and reduce the security risks for website publishers as well
as their users. I show that our novel techniques are complementary to the existing
defenses. To support my claim, I propose the following:
First, I present a novel in-browser approach called Excision that automatic-
ally detects and blocks malicious third-party content before it can attack the user’s
browser. The approach leverages a high-fidelity in-browser vantage point that allows
it to construct a precise inclusion sequence for every third-party resource. We also
describe a prototype of Excision for the Chromium browser that can effectively
prevent inclusions of malicious content. Furthermore, we evaluate the effectiveness
and performance of our prototype, and show that it is able to automatically detect
and block malicious third-party content inclusions in the wild – including malicious
resources not previously identified by popular malware blacklists – without a sig-
nificant impact on browser performance. Finally, we evaluate the usability of our
prototype and show that most users did not notice any significant quality impact on
their browsing experience.
Then, I introduce a novel in-browser approach to provenance tracking for web
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content at the granularity of DOM elements, and present semantics for provenance
propagation due to script and extension execution. The approach leverages a high-
fidelity in-browser vantage point that allows it to construct a precise provenance
label set for each DOM element introduced into a web page. We also implement a
prototype called OriginTracer that uses content provenance to identify and high-
light third-party content injection – e.g., unwanted advertisements – by extensions to
notify users of their presence and the originating principal. Furthermore, we evaluate
the effectiveness, performance, and usability of our prototype, and show that it is
able to significantly assist users in identifying ad injection by extensions in the wild
without degrading browser performance or the user experience.
Finally, I present the first automated and large-scale study of the prevalence and
significance of RPO vulnerabilities in the wild. To date, little is known about how
widespread RPO vulnerabilities are on the Web. Especially since the attack is more
recent and less well-known than traditional XSS, we believe it is important to char-
acterize the extent of the threat and quantify its enabling factors. Our measurement
methodology tests how often these preconditions hold in the wild in order to quantify
the vulnerability and exploitability of pages with respect to RPO attacks. We enu-
merate a range of factors that prevent a vulnerable page from being exploited, and
discuss how these could be used to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
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1.2 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the re-
lated work. The design and implementation of Excision for detecting malicious
third-party content inclusions are introduced in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the
architecture and evaluation of OriginTracer to identify ad injection in browser
extensions. We propose our methodology for large-scale analysis of style injection by
relative path overwrite in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
15
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we place our proposed approaches in the context of related work.
2.1 Content Isolation and Containment
Several recent research projects [41, 115, 121] attempted to improve the security of
browsers by isolating browser components in order to minimize data sharing among
software components. The main issue with these approaches is that they do not
perform any isolation between JavaScript loaded from different domains and web
applications, letting untrusted scripts access the main web application’s code and
data. Efforts such as AdJail [77] attempt to protect privacy by isolating ads into an
iframe-based sandbox. However, this approach restricts contextual targeting advert-
isement in which ad scripts need to have access to host page content.
Another approach is to search and restrict third-party code included in web appl
ications [35, 42, 80] . For example, ADsafe [3] removes dangerous JavaScript features
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(e.g., eval), enforcing a whitelist of allowed JavaScript functionality considered safe.
It is also possible to protect against malicious JavaScript ads by enforcing policies at
runtime [98, 102]. For example, Meyerovich et al. [84] introduce a client-side frame-
work that allows web applications to enforce fine-grained security policies for DOM
elements. AdSentry [30] provides a shadow JavaScript engine that runs untrusted
ad scripts in a sandboxed environment.
2.2 Blacklisting Malicious Domains
There are multiple approaches to automatically detecting malicious web domains.
Madtracer [72] has been proposed to automatically capture malvertising cases. But,
this system is not as precise as our approach in identifying the causal relationships
among different domains. EXPOSURE [18] employs passive DNS analysis techniques
to detect malicious domains. SpiderWeb [114] is also a system that is able to detect
malicious web pages by crowd-sourcing redirection chains. Segugio [101] tracks new
malware-control domain names in very large ISP networks. WebWitness [90] auto-
matically traces back malware download paths to understand attack trends. While
these techniques can be used to automatically detect malicious websites and update
blacklists, they are not online systems and may not be effectively used to detect ma-
licious third-party inclusions since users expect a certain level of performance while
browsing the Web.
Another effective detection approach is to produce blacklists of malicious sites by
scanning the Internet that can be efficiently checked by the browser (e.g., Google Safe
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Browsing [40]). Blacklist construction requires extensive infrastructure to continu-
ously scan the Internet and bypass cloaking and general malware evasion attempts
in order to reliably identify malware distribution sites, phishing pages, and other
Web malice. These blacklists sometimes lag the introduction of malicious sites on
the Internet, or fail to find these malicious sites. However, they are nevertheless
effective, and we view the approach we propose as a complementary technique to
established blacklist generation and enforcement techniques.
2.3 Browser Extension Security
Browser extension security has become a hot topic. The Chromium extension frame-
work substantially improved the ability of users to limit the amount of privilege
conferred upon potentially vulnerable extensions [15], and follow-on work has stud-
ied the success of this approach [34, 75]. Other works have broadly studied malicious
extensions that attempt to exfiltrate sensitive user data [73, 78]. For instance, Arjun
et al. showed that many extensions in the Chrome Web Store are over-privileged for
the actual services they purport to provide [43].
A line of work has focused on the problem of ad injection via browser exten-
sions. Thomas et al. [117] proposed a detection methodology in which, they used a
priori knowledge of a legitimate DOM structure to report the deviations from that
structure as potential ad injections. However, this approach is not purely client-side
and requires cooperation from content publishers. Expector [127] inspects a browser
extension and determines if it injects advertisements into websites. Hulk [58] is a
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dynamic analysis system that automatically detects Chrome extensions that perform
certain types of malicious behaviors, including ad injection. WebEval [54] is an auto-
matic system that considers an extension’s behaviors, code, and author reputation
to identify malicious extensions distributed through the Chrome Web Store. Web
Tripwires [103] were also proposed to detect in-flight page changes performed in order
to inject advertisements.
In contrast, our work does not attempt to automatically classify extensions that
engage in content modification as malicious or not, but rather focuses on enabling
users to make informed decisions as to whether extensions engage in desirable beha-
vior or not.
2.4 Provenance Tracking
A significant amount of work has examined the use of provenance in various contexts.
For instance, one line of work has studied the collection of provenance information for
generic applications up to entire systems [36, 46, 99]. However, to our knowledge, no
system considers the provenance of fine-grained web content comprising the DOM.
Provenance tracking is also related to information flow control (IFC), for which a
considerable body of work exists at the operating system level [32, 63, 131], the
language level [87, 22], as well as the web [37, 51]. In contrast to our work, IFC is
focused more on enforcing principled security guarantees for new applications rather
than tracking and indicating data provenance for existing ones. Numerous systems
have examined the use of dynamic taint analysis, a related concept to provenance.
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Some prior work [17, 33] focuses on tracking information flow within the browser,
Sabre [29] detects whether extensions access sensitive information within the browser,
and DSI enforcement [88] defends against XSS attacks by preserving the integrity
of document structure in the browser. While there is certainly an overlap between
dynamic taint analysis and provenance, taint analysis is most often focused on simple
reachability between sources and sinks, while provenance is concerned with precisely
tracking principals that influenced data.
Finally, there is a line of work that examines provenance on the web. Some
prior work [44, 45, 86] concerns coarse-grained ontologies for describing the origins
of data on the web, and does not consider provenance at a fine-grained scale within
the browser. ESCUDO [56] only considers the principals that can be controlled by
web applications, and it does not handle plug-ins and browser extensions. Leak-
Tracker [118] performs principal-based tracking on web pages to study privacy vi-
olations related to JavaScript libraries, but it only tracks injection of scripts into
the page, and does not provide any provenance information for other types of DOM
elements.
2.5 Relative Path Overwrite
The first account of RPO is attributed to a blog post by Gareth Heyes [50], intro-
ducing self-referencing a PHP script with server-side URL rewriting. Furthermore,
the post notes that certain versions of Internet Explorer allow JavaScript execution
from within a CSS context in the Compatibility View mode [85], escalating style
20
injection to XSS [128]. Another blog post by Dalili [27] extends the technique to
IIS and ASP.Net applications, and shows how URL-encoded slashes are decoded by
the server but not the browser, allowing not only self-reference but also the inclusion
of different resources. Kettle [61] coins the term Path Relative StyleSheet Import
(PRSSI) for a specific subset of RPO attacks, introduces a PRSSI vulnerability scan-
ner for Burp Suite [20], and proposes countermeasures. Terada [116] provides more
exploitation techniques for various browsers or certain web applications, and [129]
discusses an example chaining several vulnerabilities to result in a combination of
RPO and a double style injection attack. Gil shows how attackers can deceive web
cache servers by using RPO [38, 39]. Some of the attacks discussed in the various
blog posts are custom-tailored to specific sites or applications, whereas others are
more generic and apply to certain web server configurations or frameworks.
We are not aware of any scholarly work about RPO, or any research about how
prevalent RPO vulnerabilities are on the Web. To the best of our knowledge, Burp
Suite [20] is the first and only tool that can detect PRSSI vulnerabilities based on
RPO in web applications. However, in contrast to our work, it does not determine if
the vulnerability can be exploited. Furthermore, we are the first to provide a com-
prehensive survey of how widespread RPO style vulnerabilities and exploitabilities
are in the wild.
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2.6 Client-side Attacks
Script-based attacks has been studied extensively, such as systematic analysis of
XSS sanitization frameworks [124], detecting XSS vulnerabilities in Rich Internet
Applications [12], large-scale detection of DOM-based XSS [68, 76], and bypassing
XSS mitigations by Script Gadgets [67, 66]. An array of XSS prevention mechan-
isms have been proposed, such as XSS Filter [104], XSS-Guard [19], SOMA [93],
BluePrint [79], Document Structure Integrity [89], XSS Auditor [16], NoScript [81],
Context-Sensitive Auto-Sanitization (CSAS) [106], DOM-based XSS filtering using
runtime taint tracking [111], preventing script injection through software design [59],
Strict CSP [123], and DOMPurify [48]. However, the vulnerability measurements
and proposed countermeasures of these works on script injection do not apply to
RPO-based style injection.
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Chapter 3
Detection of Malicious
Third-Party Content Inclusions
3.1 Introduction
While the Same Origin Policy (SOP) enforces a modicum of origin-based separation
between code and data from different principals, developers have clamored for more
flexible sharing models provided by, e.g., Content Security Policy (CSP) [10], Cross-
Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) [9], and postMessage-based cross-frame commu-
nication. These newer standards permit greater flexibility in performing cross-origin
inclusions, and each come with associated mechanisms for restricting communica-
tion to trusted origins. However, recent work has shown that these standards are
difficult to apply securely in practice [109, 125], and do not necessarily address the
challenges of trusting remote inclusions on the dynamic Web. In addition to the in-
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applicability of some approaches such as CSP, third parties can leverage their power
to bypass these security mechanisms. For example, ISPs and browser extensions
are able to tamper with HTTP traffic to modify or remove CSP rules in HTTP
responses [54, 117].
In this chapter, we propose an in-browser approach called Excision to auto-
matically detect and block malicious third-party content inclusions as web pages are
loaded into the user’s browser or during the execution of browser extensions. Our
approach does not rely on examination of the content of the resources; rather, it re-
lies on analyzing the sequence of inclusions that leads to the resolution and loading
of a terminal remote resource. Unlike prior work [72], Excision resolves inclusion
sequences through instrumentation of the browser itself, an approach that provides
a high-fidelity view of the third-party inclusion process as well as the ability to inter-
dict content loading in real-time. This precise view also renders ineffective common
obfuscation techniques used by attackers to evade detection. Obfuscation causes the
detection rate of these approaches to degrade significantly since obfuscated third-
party inclusions cannot be traced using existing techniques [72]. Furthermore, the
in-browser property of our system allows users to browse websites with a higher con-
fidence since malicious third-party content is prevented from being included while
the web page is loading.
We implemented Excision as a set of modifications to the Chromium browser,
and evaluated its effectiveness by analyzing the Alexa Top 200K over a period of 11
months. Our evaluation demonstrates that Excision achieves a 93.39% detection
rate, a false positive rate of 0.59%, and low performance overhead. We also performed
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a usability test of our research prototype, which shows that Excision does not
detract from the user’s browsing experience while automatically protecting the user
from the vast majority of malicious content on the Web. The detection results suggest
that Excision could be used as a complementary system to other techniques such
as CSP.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the necessary
background. Section 3.3 presents the architecture of Excision, while Section 3.4
discusses the implementation of our system. We present an evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness, usability, and performance of our prototype in Section 3.5. Finally, a
discussion about our system is presented in Section 3.6, and Section 3.7 summarizes
the chapter.
3.2 Background
In the following, we first discuss the threats posed by third-party content and then
motivate our work.
3.2.1 Threats
While the inclusion of third-party content provides convenience for web developers
and allows for integration into advertising distribution, analytics, and social media
networks, it can potentially introduce a set of serious security threats for users.
For instance, advertising networks and social media have been and continue to be
abused as a vector for injection of malware. Website operators, or publishers, have
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little control over this content aside from blind trust or security through isolation.
Attacks distributed through these vectors – in the absence of isolation – execute
with the same privileges as all other JavaScript within the security context of the
enclosing DOM. In general, malicious code could launch drive-by downloads [25],
redirect visitors to phishing sites, generate fraudulent clicks on advertisements [72],
or steal user information [52].
Moreover, ad injection has become a new source of income for ISPs and browser
extension authors [82]. ISPs inject advertisements into web pages by tampering with
their users’ HTTP traffic [23], and browser extension authors have recently started
to inject or replace ads in web pages to monetize their work. Ad injection negatively
impacts both website publishers and users by diverting revenue from publishers and
exposing users to malvertising [117, 127]. In addition to ad injection, malicious
browser extensions can also pose significant risks to users due to the special privileges
they have [58].
3.2.2 Motivation
Publishers can try to isolate untrusted third-party content using iframes (perhaps
enhanced with HTML5 sandboxing features), language-based sandboxing, or policy
enforcement [3, 35, 42, 77, 80]. However, these approaches are not commonly used in
practice; some degrade the quality of ads (from the advertiser’s perspective), while
others are non-trivial to deploy. Publishers could attempt to use Content Security
Policy (CSP) [10] to define and enforce access control lists for remote inclusions in
the browser. However, due to the dynamic nature of the web, this approach (and
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similar access control policy-based techniques) has problems. Recent studies [109,
125] indicate that CSP is difficult to apply in practice. A major reason for this
is the unpredictability of the origins of inclusions for third-party resources, which
complicates the construction of a correct, yet tight, policy.
For example, when websites integrate third-party advertisements, multiple origins
can be contacted in order to deliver an ad to the user’s browser. This is often
due to the practice of re-selling ad space (a process known as ad syndication) or
through real-time ad auctions. Either of these approaches can result in ads being
delivered through a series of JavaScript code inclusions [113]. As a consequence, a
long inclusion sequence of distinct origins will be observed that – critically – does
not remain constant on successive loads of the enclosing web page. Additionally,
the growing number of browser extensions makes it a non-trivial task for website
operators to enumerate the set of benign origins from which browser extensions
might include a resource. Therefore, defining an explicit whitelist of CSP rules is a
challenging task.
To illustrate, Figure 3.1 shows the unique number of domains as well as the
cumulative number of unique domains included by theverge.com over a period of 11
months. The unique number of domains increases roughly linearly over this period;
clearly, constructing an effective access control policy that tightly captures the set
of allowable inclusions while avoiding false positives that would lead to either lost
revenue or broken functionality is difficult.
Even if website publishers can keep pace with origin diversity over time with a
comprehensive list of CSP rules, ISPs and browser extensions are able to tamper with
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Figure 3.1: Unique number of included domains in theverge.com over 11 months.
Measurements were collected as part of the data set described in Section 3.5; the
sampling frequency was approximately once every three days
in-transit HTTP traffic and modify CSP rules sent by the websites. In addition, in
browsers such as Chrome, the web page’s CSP does not apply to extension scripts
executed in the page’s context [4]; hence, extensions are able to include arbitrary
third-party resources into the web page.
Given the challenges described above, we believe that existing techniques such
as CSP can be evaded and, hence, there is a need for an automatic approach to
protect users from malicious third-party content. We do not necessarily advocate
such an approach in isolation, however. Instead, we envision this approach as a
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Figure 3.2: An overview of Excision
complementary defense that can be layered with other techniques in order to improve
the safety of the Web.
3.3 Design
In this section, we describe Excision, our approach for detecting and blocking the
inclusion of malicious third-party content in real-time. An overview of our system is
shown in Figure 3.2. Excision operates by extracting resource inclusion trees from
within the browser. The inclusion tree precisely records the inclusion relationships
between different resources in a web page. When the user requests a web page, the
browser retrieves the corresponding HTML document and passes it to the rendering
engine. The rendering engine incrementally constructs an inclusion tree for the DOM
and begins extracting external resources such as scripts and frames as it reaches new
HTML tags. For inclusion of a new resource, the rendering engine consults the CSP
engine and the inclusion sequence classifier in order to decide whether to include
the resource. If the resource’s origin and type are whitelisted in the CSP rules,
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the rendering engine includes the resource without consulting the inclusion sequence
classifier and continues parsing the rest of the HTML document. Otherwise, it ex-
tracts the inclusion sequence (path through the page’s inclusion tree) for the resource
and forwards this to the inclusion sequence classifier. Using pre-learned models, the
classifier returns a decision about the malice of the resource to the rendering engine.
Finally, the rendering engine discards the resource if it was identified as malicious.
The same process occurs for resources that are included dynamically during the
execution of extension content scripts after they are injected into the page.
3.3.1 Inclusion Trees and Sequences
A website can include resources in an HTML document from any origin so long as the
inclusion respects the same origin policy, its standard exceptions, or any additional
policies due to the use of CSP, CORS, or other access control framework. A first
approximation to understanding the inclusions of third-party content for a given
web page is to process its DOM tree [126] while the page loads. However, direct
use of a web page’s DOM tree is unsatisfactory because the DOM does not in fact
reliably record the inclusion relationships between resources referenced by a page.
This follows from the ability for JavaScript to manipulate the DOM at run-time
using the DOM API.
Instead, in this work we define an inclusion tree abstraction extracted directly
from the browser’s resource loading code. Unlike a DOM tree, the inclusion tree
represents how different resources are included in a web page that is invariant with
respect to run-time DOM updates. It also discards irrelevant portions of the DOM
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Web Page:a.com/index.html
<html>
  <head><title>...</title></head>
  <body>
    <ul><li>...</li></ul>
    <a href=”…”></a>
    <div>
      <script src=”script.js”></script>
      <img src=”b.net/img.jpg”>
      <script src=”c.org/script.js”></script>
      <link href=”c.org/style.css”>
    </div>
    <img src=”img.jpg”/>
    <script src=”d.com/script.js”></script>
    <iframe src=”e.net/frame.html”>
      <html>
        <head></head>
        <body>
          <script>...</script>
          <object data=”f.org/flash.swf”></object>
        </body>
      </html>
    </iframe>
    <script src=”g.com/script.js”></script>
    <img src=”h.org/img.jpg”/>
  </body>
</html>
a.com/script.js
a.com/index.html
c.org/script.js
b.net/img.jpg
c.org/style.css
(a) (b)
d.com/script.js
inline-script
f.org/flash.swf
a.com/img.jpg
e.net/frame.html
ext-id/script.js
h.org/img.jpg
g.com/script.js
Figure 3.3: (a) DOM Tree, and (b) Inclusion Tree
tree that do not reference remote content. For each resource in the inclusion tree,
there is an inclusion sequence that begins with the root resource (i.e., the URL
of the web page) and terminates with the corresponding resource. Furthermore,
browser extensions can also manipulate the web page by injecting and executing
JavaScript code in the page’s context. Hence, the injected JavaScript is considered
a direct child of the root node in the inclusion tree. An example of a DOM tree and
its corresponding inclusion tree is shown in Figure 3.3. As shown in Figure 3.3b,
f.org/flash.swf has been dynamically added by an inline script to the DOM
tree, and its corresponding inclusion sequence has a length of 4 since we remove the
inline resources from inclusion sequence. Moreover, ext-id/script.js is injected
by an extension as the direct child of the root resource. This script then included
g.com/script.js, which in turn included h.org/img.jpg.
When we consider the full URL for constructing an inclusion sequence, the res-
ulting sequence is called a URL Inclusion Sequence. Figure 3.4a shows the URL
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a.com f.net g.org i.net
a.com/index.htm f.net/adtag.js g.org/banner.htm
i.net/flash.swfg.org/adtag.js
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4: (a) URL Inclusion Sequence, and (b) Domain Inclusion Sequence
inclusion sequence of the resource i.net/flash.swf. However, some malware cam-
paigns change their URL patterns frequently to avoid detection. This can be done by
changing the URL path and the parameter values [72]. To overcome this problem and
capture the high-level relationships between different websites, we only consider a
domain part of the URL to build the Domain Inclusion Sequence. Figure 3.4b shows
the domain inclusion sequence corresponding to the aforementioned URL inclusion
sequence. As depicted, if consecutive URLs in a sequence have the same domains,
we merge them into one node. From now on, by inclusion sequence, we refer to a
domain inclusion sequence unless we mention URL inclusion sequence explicitly.
3.3.2 Inclusion Sequence Classification
Given an inclusion sequence, Excision must classify it as benign or malicious based
on features extracted from the sequence. The task of the inclusion sequence classifier
is to assign a class label from the set {benign,malicious} to a given sequence based
on previously learned models from a labeled data set. In our definition, a malicious
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sequence is one that starts from the root URL of a web page and terminates in a URL
that delivers malicious content. For classification, we used hidden Markov models
(HMM) [100]. Models are comprised of states, each of which holds transitions to other
states based on a probability distribution. Each state can probabilistically emit a
symbol from an alphabet. There are other sequence classification techniques such
as Naïve Bayes [69], but we used an HMM for our classifier because we also want
to model the inter-dependencies between the resources that compose an inclusion
sequence.
In the training phase, the system learns two HMMs from a training set of labeled
sequences, one for the benign class and one for the malicious class. We estimated
the HMM parameters by employing the Baum-Welch algorithm which finds the max-
imum likelihood estimate of these parameters based on the set of observed sequences.
In our system, we empirically selected 20 for the number of states that are fully con-
nected to each other. In the subsequent detection phase, we compute the likelihood
of a new sequence given the trained models using the forward-backward algorithm
and assign the sequence to the class with the highest likelihood. Training hidden
Markov models is computationally expensive. However, computing the likelihood of
a sequence is instead very efficient, which makes it a suitable method for real-time
classification [100].
3.3.3 Classification Features
Let r0 → r1 → · · · → rn be an inclusion sequence as described above. Feature
extraction begins by converting the inclusion sequence into sequences of feature vec-
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tors. After analyzing the inclusion trees of several thousand benign and malicious
websites for a period of 11 months, we identified 12 feature types from three categor-
ies. For each feature type, we compute two different features: individual and relative
features. An individual feature value is only dependent on the current resource, but
a relative feature value is dependent on the current resource and its preceding (or
parent) resources. Consequently, we have 24 features for each resource in an inclu-
sion sequence. Individual features can have categorical or continuous values. All
continuous feature values are normalized on [0, 1] and their values are discretized. In
the case of continuous individual features, the relative feature values are computed
by comparing the individual value of the resource to its parent’s individual value.
The result of the comparison is less, equal, or more. We use the value none for the
root resource. To capture the high-level relationships between different inclusions,
we only consider the domain part of the URL for feature calculation.
3.3.3.1 DNS-based Features
The first feature category that we consider is based on DNS properties of the resource
domain.
Top-Level Domain. For this feature, we measure the types of TLDs from which
a resource is included and how it changes along the inclusion sequence. For every
resource in an inclusion sequence, we assign one of the values in Table 3.1a as an indi-
vidual feature. For the relative feature, we consider the changes that occur between
the top-level domain of the preceding resource and the resource itself. Table 3.1b
shows 15 different values of the relative TLD feature.
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Table 3.1: TLD values
(a) Individual
Value Example
none IPs, Extensions
gen *.com, *.org
gen-subdomain *.us.com
cc *.us, *.de, *.cn
cc-subdomain *.co.uk, *.com.cn
cc-int *.xn--p1ai (ru)
other *.biz, *.info
(b) Relative
Value Example
none root resource
{got,lost}-tld Ext. → *.de, *.us → IP
gen-to-{cc,other} *.org → {*.de, *.info}
cc-to-{gen,other} *.uk → {*.com, *.biz}
other-to-{gen,cc} *.info → {*.net, *.uk}
same-{gen,cc,other} *.com → *.com
diff-{gen,cc,other} *.info → *.biz
Type. This feature identifies the types of resource domains and their changes along
the inclusion sequence. Possible values of individual and relative features are shown
in Table 3.2a and Table 3.2b respectively.
Level. A domain name consists of a set of labels separated by dots. We say a
domain name with n labels is in level n − 1. For example, www.google.com is in
level 2. For IP addresses and extension scripts, we consider their level to be 1. For a
given domain, we compute the individual feature by dividing the level by a maximum
value of 126.
Alexa Ranking. We also consider the ranking of a resource’s domain in the Alexa
Top 1M websites. To compute the normalized ranking as an individual feature, we
divide the ranking of the domain by one million. For IP addresses, extensions, and
domains that are not in the top 1M, we use the value none.
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Table 3.2: Type values
(a) Individual
Value Example
ipv6 2607:f0d0::::4
ipv4-private 192.168.0.1
ipv4-public 4.2.2.4
extension Ext. Scripts
dns-sld google.com
dns-sld-sub www.google.com
dns-non-sld abc.dyndns.org
dns-non-sld-sub a.b.dyndns.org
(b) Relative
Value Example
none root resource
same-site w.google.com → ad.google.com
same-sld 1.dyndns.org → 2.dyndns.org
same-company ad.google.com → www.google.de
same-eff-tld bbc.co.uk → london.co.uk
same-tld bbc.co.uk → london.uk
different google.com → facebook.net
3.3.3.2 String-based Features
We observed that malicious domain names often make liberal use of digits and hy-
phens in combination with alphabetical characters. So, in this feature category, we
characterize the string properties of resource domains. For IP addresses and exten-
sion scripts, we assign the value 1 for individual features.
Non-Alphabetic Characters. For this feature, we compute the individual fea-
ture value by dividing the number of non-alphabetical characters over the length of
domain.
Unique Characters. We also measure the number of unique characters that are
used in a domain. The individual feature is the number of unique characters in the
domain divided by the maximum number of unique characters in the domain name,
which is 38 (26 alphabetics, 10 digits, hyphen, and dot).
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Character Frequency. For this feature, we simply measure how often a single
character is seen in a domain. To compute an individual feature value, we calculate
the frequency of each character in the domain and then divide the average of these
frequencies by the length of the domain to normalize the value.
Length. In this feature, we measure the length of the domain divided by the max-
imum length of a domain, which is 253.
Entropy. In practice, benign domains are typically intended to be memorable to
users. This is often not a concern for attackers, as evidenced by the use of domain
generation algorithms [18]. Consequently, we employ Shannon entropy to measure
the randomness of domains in the inclusion sequence. We calculate normalized en-
tropy as the absolute Shannon entropy divided by the maximum entropy for the
domain name.
3.3.3.3 Role-based Features
We observed that identifying the role of resources in the inclusion sequences can
be helpful in detecting malicious resources. For example, recent work [92] reveals
that attackers misuse ad networks as well as URL shortening services for malicious
intent. So far, we consider three roles for a resource: i) ad-network, ii) content
delivery network (CDN), and iii) URL shortening service. In total, we have three
features in this category, as each domain can simultaneously perform multiple roles.
Both individual and relative features in this category have binary values. For the
individual feature, the value is Yes if the domain has the role, and No otherwise. For
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the relative feature, we assign a value Yes if at least one of the preceding domains
have the corresponding role, and No otherwise. For extension scripts, we assign the
value No for all of the features. To assign the roles, we compiled a list of common
domains related to these roles that contains 5,767 ad-networks, 48 CDNs, and 461
URL shortening services.
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we discuss our prototype implementation of Excision for detecting
and blocking malicious third-party content inclusions. We implemented Excision as
a set of modifications to the Chromium browser. In order to implement our system,
we needed to modify Blink and the Chromium extension engine to enable Excision
to detect and block inclusions of malicious content in an online and automatic fashion
while the web page is loading. The entire set of modifications consists of less than
1,000 lines of C++ and several lines of JavaScript1. While our implementation could
be adopted as-is by any browser vendors that use WebKit-derived engines, the design
presented here is highly likely to be portable to other browsers.
3.4.1 Enhancements to the Blink
Blink is primarily responsible for parsing HTML documents, managing script execu-
tion, and fetching resources from the network. Consequently, it is ideally suited for
constructing the inclusion tree for a web page, as well as blocking the inclusion of
1https://github.com/sajjadium/Excision
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malicious content.
3.4.1.1 Tracking Resource Inclusion
Static resource inclusions that are hard-coded by publishers inside the page’s HTML
are added to the inclusion tree as the direct children of the root node. For dynamic
inclusions (e.g., via the document.createElement() and document.write() DOM
API functions), the system must find the script resource responsible for the resource
inclusion. To monitor dynamic resource inclusions, the system tracks the start and
termination of script execution. Any resources that are included in this interval will
be considered as the children of that script resource in the inclusion tree.
3.4.1.2 Handling Events and Timers
Events and timers are widely used by web developers to respond to user interactions
(e.g., clicking on an element) or schedule execution of code after some time has
elapsed. To capture the creation and firing of events and timers, the system tracks
the registration of callback functions for the corresponding APIs.
3.4.2 Enhancements to the Extension Engine
The Chromium extension engine handles the loading, management, and execution
of extensions. To access the page’s DOM, the extension injects and executes content
scripts in the page’s context which are regular JavaScript programs.
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3.4.2.1 Tracking Content Scripts Injection and Execution
Content scripts are usually injected into web pages either via the extension’s manifest
file using the content_scripts field or at runtime via the executeScript API.
Either way, content scripts are considered direct children of the root node in the
inclusion tree. Therefore, in order to track the inclusion of resources as a result of
content script execution, the extension engine was modified to track the injection
and execution of content scripts.
3.4.2.2 Handling Callback Functions
Like any other JavaScript program, content scripts rely heavily on callback functions.
For instance, onMessage and sendMessage are used by content scripts to exchange
messages with their background pages. To track the execution of callback functions,
two JavaScript files were modified in the extension engine which are responsible for
invocation and management of callback functions.
3.5 Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the security benefits, performance, and usability of the
Excision prototype. We describe the data sets we used to train and evaluate the
system, and then present the results of the experiments.
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Table 3.3: Summary of crawling statistics
Item Website Crawl Extension Crawl
Websites Crawled 234,529 20
Unavailable Websites 7,412 0
Unique Inclusion Trees 47,789,268 35,004
Unique Inclusion Sequences 27,261,945 61,489
Unique URLs 546,649,590 72,064
Unique Domains 1,368,021 1,144
Unique Sites 459,615 749
Unique SLDs 419,119 723
Unique Companies 384,820 719
Unique Effective TLDs 1,115 21
Unique TLDs 404 21
Unique IPs 9,755 3
3.5.1 Data Collection
To collect inclusion sequences, we performed two separate crawls for websites and
extensions. The summary of crawling statistics are presented in Table 3.3.
3.5.1.1 Website Crawl
We built a crawler based on an instrumented version of PhantomJS [6], a scriptable
open source browser based on WebKit, and crawled the home pages of the Alexa
Top 200K. We performed our data collection from June 20th, 2014 to May 11th,
2015. The crawl was parallelized by deploying 50 crawler instances on five virtual
machines, each of which crawled a fixed subset of the Alexa Top 200K websites. To
ensure that visited websites did not store any data on the clients, the crawler ran a
fresh instance of PhantomJS for each visit. Once all crawlers finished crawling the
list of websites, the process was restarted from the beginning. To thwart cloaking
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techniques [57] utilized by attackers, the crawlers presented a user agent for IE 6.0
on Windows and employed Tor to send HTTP requests from different source IP
addresses. We also address JavaScript-based browser fingerprinting by modifying
the internal implementation of the navigator object to return a fake value for the
appCodeName, appName, appVersion, platform, product, userAgent, and vendor
attributes.
3.5.1.2 Extension Crawl
To collect inclusion sequences related to extensions, we used 292 Chrome extensions
reported in prior work [127] that injected ads into web pages. Since ad-injecting
extensions mostly target shopping websites (e.g., Amazon), we chose the Alexa Top
20 shopping websites for crawling to trigger ad injection by those 292 extensions.
We built a crawler by instrumenting Chromium 43 and collected data for a period
of one week from June 16th to June 22nd, 2015. The system loaded every extension
and then visited the home pages of the Alexa Top 20 shopping websites using Sel-
enium WebDriver [107]. This process was repeated after crawling the entire set of
extensions. In addition, our crawler triggered all the events and timers registered by
content scripts.
3.5.2 Building Labeled Datasets
To classify a given inclusion sequence as benign or malicious, we trained two hid-
den Markov models for benign and malicious inclusion sequences from our data set.
We labeled collected inclusion sequences as either benign or malicious using Virus-
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Table 3.4: Data sets used in the evaluation
Dataset No. of Inclusion Sequences No. of Terminal Domains
Website Crawl Ext. Crawl Website Crawl Ext. Crawl
Benign 3,706,451 7,372 35,044 250
Malicious 25,153 19 1,226 2
Total [8]. VirusTotal’s URL scanning service aggregates reports of malicious URLs
from most prominent URL scanners such as Google Safe Browsing [40] and the Mal-
ware Domain List. The malicious data set contains all inclusion sequences where the
last included resource’s domain is reported malicious by at least three out of the 62
URL scanners in VirusTotal. On the other hand, the benign data set only contains
inclusion sequences that do not contain any domain in the entire sequence that is
reported as malicious by any URL scanner in VirusTotal. To build benign data set,
we considered reputable domains such as well-known search engines and advertising
networks as benign regardless of whether they are reported as malicious by any URL
scanner in VirusTotal. Table 3.4 summarizes the data sets2. The unique number of
inclusion sequences and terminal domains are shown separately for the website and
extension data sets. The terminal domains column is the number of unique domains
that terminate inclusion sequences.
3.5.3 Detection Results
To evaluate the accuracy of our classifier, we used 10-fold cross-validation, in which
we first partitioned each data set into 10 equal-sized folds, trained the models on nine
2https://github.com/sajjadium/Excision
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Figure 3.5: Effectiveness of features for classification (D = DNS, S = String, R =
Role)
folds, and then validated the resulting models with the remaining fold. The process
was repeated for each fold and, at the end, we calculated the average false positive
rate and false negative rate. When splitting the data set into training and testing
sets, we made sure that inclusion sequences with different lengths were present in
both. We also ensured that both sets contained extension-related inclusion sequences.
The results show that our classifier achieved a false positive rate of 0.59% and
false negative rate of 6.61% (detection rate of 93.39%). Most of the false positives are
due to inclusion sequences that do not appear too often in the training sets. Hence,
users are unlikely to experience many false positives in a real browsing environment
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(as will be shown in our usability analysis in Section 3.5.6).
To quantify the contribution of different feature categories to the classification,
we trained classifiers using different combinations of feature categories and compared
the results. Figure 3.5 shows the false positive rate and false negative rate of every
combination with a 10-fold cross-validation training scheme. According to Figure 3.5,
the best false positive and false negative rates were obtained using the combination
of all feature categories.
3.5.4 Comparison with URL Scanners
To evaluate the ability of our system in detecting unreported suspicious domains, we
ran our classifier on inclusion sequences collected from June 1st until July 14th, 2015.
We compared our detection results with reports from URL scanners in VirusTotal
and detected 89 new suspicious domains. We believe that these domains are in fact
dedicated malicious domains that play the role of redirectors and manage malicious
traffic flows as described in prior work [71]. These domains did not deliver malicious
resources themselves, but they consistently included resources from other domains
that were flagged as malicious by URL scanners. Out of 89 suspicious domains,
nearly 44% were recently registered in 2015, and more than 23% no longer resolve
to an IP address.
Furthermore, we detected 177 domains that were later reported by URL scanners
after some delay. Figure 3.6 shows the early detection results of our system. A
significant number of these domains were not reported until some time had passed
after Excision initially identified them. For instance, nearly 78% of the malicious
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Figure 3.6: Early detection results
domains were not reported by any URL scanner during the first week.
3.5.5 Performance
To assess the performance of Excision, we used Selenium to automatically visit
the Alexa Top 1K with both original and modified Chromium browsers. In order to
measure our prototype performance with a realistic set of extensions, we installed
five of the most popular extensions in the Chrome Web Store: Adblock Plus, Google
Translate, Google Dictionary, Evernote Web Clipper, and Tampermonkey.
For each browser, we visited the home pages of the entire list of websites and
recorded the total elapsed time. Due to the dynamic nature of ads and their influence
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on page load time, we repeated the experiment 10 times and measured the average
elapsed time. On average, the elapsed times were 3,065 and 3,438 seconds for the
original and modified browsers, respectively. Therefore, Excision incurred a 12.2%
overhead on browsing time on average, which corresponds to a noticeable overhead
that is nevertheless acceptable for many users (see Section 3.5.6). To measure the
overhead incurred by Excision on browser startup time, we launched the modified
browser 10 times and measured the average browser launch time. Excision caused
a 3.2 seconds delay on browser startup time, which is ameliorated by the fact that
this is a one-time performance hit.
3.5.6 Usability
We conducted an experiment to evaluate the impact of Excision on the user’s
browsing experience. We conducted the study on 10 students that self-reported as
expert Internet users. We provided each participant with a list of 50 websites that
were selected randomly from the Alexa Top 500 and then asked them to visit at least
three levels down in each website. Participants were asked to report the number of
visited pages and the list of domains reported as malicious by our system. In addition,
participants were asked to record the number of errors they encountered while they
browsed the websites. Errors were considered to occur when the browser crashed, the
appearance of a web page was corrupted, or page load times were abnormally long.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that benign extensions were not prevented from
executing as expected in the presence of our system, the browser was configured to
load the five popular extensions listed in Section 3.5.5 and participants were asked
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to report any problem while using the extensions.
The results of the study show that out of 5,129 web pages visited by the par-
ticipants, only 83 errors were encountered and the majority of web pages loaded
correctly. Most of these errors happened due to relatively high load times. In ad-
dition, none of the participants reported any broken extensions. Furthermore, 31
malicious inclusions were reported by our tool that were automatically processed
(without manual examination, for privacy reasons) using VirusTotal. Based on the
results, we believe that our proof-of-concept prototype is compatible with frequently
used websites and extensions, and can be improved through further engineering to
work completely free of errors.
Ethics. In designing the usability experiment, we made a conscious effort to avoid
collecting personal or sensitive information. In particular, we restricted the kinds of
information we asked users to report to incidence counts for each of the categories
of information, except for malicious URLs that were reported by our tool. Malicious
URLs were automatically submitted to VirusTotal to obtain a malice classification
before being discarded, and were not viewed by us or manually inspected. In addition,
the participants were asked to avoid browsing websites requiring a login or involving
sensitive subject matter.
3.6 Discussion
Our study shows that detecting malicious third-party inclusions is possible by analyz-
ing resource inclusion sequences. According to the evaluation results, Excision can
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detect a large number of malicious inclusions with a low false positive rate of 0.59%.
However, due to the in-browser and real-time nature of our system, we cannot easily
incorporate other useful features such as domain registration information or a global
view of Web inclusions into our detection system. For domain registration informa-
tion, we would need to regularly fetch domain whois records; as these databases are
rate-limited, this is not currently feasible. In this work, we crafted a feature set that
is suited for an online, in-browser system to detects malicious inclusion sequences
as web pages load. But, attackers might try to exploit features we adopt to avoid
detection by Excision. For example, they might choose more meaningful names for
their domains or improve their domains’ Alexa rankings with SEO techniques [57].
However, these attempts are not very effective since Excision rely on the business
relationship between the hosts inside the inclusion sequences for finding malicious
resource in addition to the individual hosts characteristics. Attackers need to change
the sequence of inclusions to evade our system which is not a trivial task and it
increases the difficulty of the attack significantly.
Moreover, we envision that both web users and website administrators can benefit
from using Excision. Excision protects users from attacks by preventing browsers
from including a malicious resource into web pages. Furthermore, Excision allows
website administrators to have more control over the content that is delivered to
their visitors when they sell space to ad networks. Administrators do not need
to write comprehensive CSP rules to control dynamic content that is managed by
third-party content providers. In addition to website administrators and web users,
the models learned by Excision can be used by ad networks, URL scanners, and
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large organizations as well. They could passively crawl various websites to identify
compromised websites and malicious origins, and this information could be used to
augment blacklists and reputation-based services (e.g., Google Safebrowsing) and
also update corporate firewall policies to prevent other clients from loading resources
from those malicious origins.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented Excision, an in-browser system to automatically de-
tect and block malicious third-party content inclusions before they can attack the
user’s browser. Our system is implemented as a set of modifications to the Chro-
mium browser and does not perform any blacklisting to detect malicious third-party
inclusions. Our evaluation over an 11 month crawl of the Alexa Top 200K demon-
strates that the prototype implementation of Excision achieved a 93.39% detection
rate with a false positive rate of 0.59%. We also evaluated the performance and us-
ability of Excision when browsing popular websites, and showed that the approach
is capable of improving the security of users on the Web by detecting 31 malicious
inclusions during a user study without significantly degrading the user experience.
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Chapter 4
Identifying Ad Injection in
Browser Extensions
4.1 Introduction
While ad injection cannot necessarily be categorized as an outright malicious activity
on its own, it is highly likely that many users in fact do not want or expect browser
extensions to inject advertisements or other content into Web pages. Moreover, it can
have a significant impact on the security and privacy of both users as well as website
publishers. For example, recent studies have shown that ad-injecting extensions
not only serve ads from ad networks other than the ones with which the website
publishers intended, but they also attempt to trick users into installing malware by
inserting rogue elements into the web page [117, 127].
To address this problem, several automatic approaches have been proposed to
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detect malicious behaviors (e.g., ad injection) in browser extensions [127, 58, 54].
In addition, centralized distribution points such as Chrome Web Store and Mozilla
Add-ons are using semi-automated techniques for review of extension behavior to
detect misbehaving extensions. However, there is no guarantee that analyzing the
extensions for a limited period of time leads to revealing the ad injection behaviors.
Finally, a client-side detection methodology has been proposed in [117] that reports
any deviation from a legitimate DOM structure as potential ad injections. However,
this approach requires a priori knowledge of a legitimate DOM structure as well as
cooperation from content publishers.
Although ad injection can therefore potentially pose significant risks, this issue
is not as clear-cut as it might first seem. Some users might legitimately want the
third-party content injected by the extensions they install, even including injected
advertisements. This creates a fundamental dilemma for automated techniques that
aim to identify clearly malicious or unwanted content injection, since such techniques
cannot intuit user intent and desires in a fully automatic way.
To resolve this dilemma, we present OriginTracer, an in-browser approach
to highlight extension-based content modification of web pages. OriginTracer
monitors the execution of browser extensions to detect content modifications such
as the injection of advertisements. Content modifications are visually highlighted in
the context of the web page in order to i) notify users of the presence of modified
content, and ii) inform users of the source of the modifications.
With this information, users can then make an informed decision as to whether
they actually want these content modifications from specific extensions, or whether
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they would rather uninstall the extensions that violate their expectations.
OriginTracer assists users in detecting content injection by distinguishing in-
jected or modified DOM elements from genuine page elements. This is performed by
annotating web page DOM elements with a provenance label set that indicates the
principal(s) responsible for adding or modifying that element, both while the page is
loading from the publisher as well as during normal script and extension execution.
These annotations serve as trustworthy, fine-grained provenance indicators for web
page content. OriginTracer can be easily integrated into any browser in order to
inform users of extension-based content modification. Since OriginTracer identi-
fies all types of content injections, it is able to highlight all injected advertisements
regardless of their types (e.g., flash ads, banner ads, and text ads).
We implemented a prototype of OriginTracer as a set of modifications to the
Chromium browser, and evaluated its effectiveness by conducting a user study. The
user study reveals that OriginTracer produced a significantly greater awareness
of third-party content modification, and did not detract from the users’ browsing
experience.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the necessary
background on browser extensions and ad injection. Section 4.3 presents our ap-
proach to web content provenance, while Section 4.4 discusses the implementation of
our prototype system. An evaluation of the effectiveness, usability, and performance
of our prototype is presented in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 summarizes the paper.
53
4.2 Background
In the following, we introduce background information on browser extensions, present
an overview of advertisement injection as a canonical example of questionable content
modification, and motivate our approach in this context.
4.2.1 Browser Extensions
Browser extensions are programs that extend the functionality of a web browser.
Today, extensions are typically implemented using a combination of HTML, CSS,
and JavaScript written against a browser-specific extension API. These APIs expose
the ability to modify the browser user interface in controlled ways, manipulate HTTP
headers, and modify web page content through the document object model (DOM)
API. An extension ecosystem is provided by almost all major browser vendors; for
instance, Google and Mozilla both host centralized repositories of extensions that
users can download at the Chrome Web Store and Mozilla Add-ons sites, respectively.
4.2.2 Advertisement Injection
As web advertising grew in popularity, those in a position to modify web content
such as ISPs and browser extension authors realized that profit could be realized by
injecting or replacing ads in web pages. For instance, some ISPs began to tamper
with HTTP traffic in transit, injecting DOM elements into HTML documents that
added ISP’s advertisements into pages visited by their customers [24, 64]. In a similar
fashion, browser extensions started modifying pages to inject DOM elements in order
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Figure 4.1: Overview of advertisement injection. (1) The user accesses the pub-
lisher’s site. (2) An ad-injecting browser extension adds DOM elements to display
ads to the user, and optionally removes existing ads. (3) Ad revenue is diverted
from the publisher. (4) Ad impressions, clicks, and conversions are instead directed
to the extension’s ad network. (5) Ad revenue flows to the extension author.
to show ads to users without necessarily obtaining the user’s prior consent. Ad
injection has evolved to become a common form of unrequested third-party content
injection on today’s web [82].
These practices have several effects on both publishers and users. On one hand,
ad injection diverts revenue from the publisher to the third party responsible for the
ad injection. If advertisements are the primary source of income for a publisher,
this can have a significant effect on their bottom line. If the injected ads contain or
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reference undesired content (e.g., adult or political topics), ad injection can also harm
the reputation of the publisher from the user’s perspective. If the content injection is
also malicious in nature, the publisher’s reputation can be further harmed in addition
to exposing users to security risks due to malware, phishing, and other threats. Prior
work has shown that users exposed to ad injection are more likely to be exposed to
“malvertising” and traditional malware [117, 127]. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of
ad injection’s effect on the normal ad delivery process, while Figure 4.3 shows an
instance of ad injection on amazon.com website.
4.2.3 Motivation
Recently, there have been efforts by browser vendors to remove ad-injecting ex-
tensions from their repositories [1]. Although semi-automated central approaches
have been successful in identifying ad-injecting extensions, deceptive extensions can
simply hide their ad injection behaviors during the short period of analysis time. In
addition, finding web pages that trigger ad injection is a non-trivial task, and they
can miss some ad-injecting extensions. Moreover, there are extensions that are not
provided through the web stores, and users can get them from local marketplaces,
which may not examined the extensions properly. Hence, we believe that there is a
need for a protection tool to combat ad injection on the client side in addition to
centralized examination by browser vendors.
Furthermore, automatically determining whether third-party content modifica-
tion – such as that due to ad injection – should be allowed is not straightforward.
Benign extensions extensively modify web pages as part of their normal function-
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Table 4.1: Five popular Chrome extensions that modify web pages as part of their
benign functionality
Extension No. of Users Injected Element
Adblock Plus 10,000,000+ <iframe>
Google Translate 6,000,000+ <div>
Tampermonkey 5,800,000+ <img>
Evernote Web Clipper 4,300,000+ <iframe>
Google Dictionary 3,000,000+ <div>
ality. To substantiate this, we examined five popular Chrome extensions as of the
time of writing; these are listed in Table 4.1. Each of these extensions are available
for all major browsers, and all modify web pages (e.g., inject elements) to implement
their functionality. Therefore, automated approaches based on this criterion run
a high risk of false positives when attempting to identify malicious or undesirable
extensions.
Moreover, it is not enough to identify that advertisements, for instance, have
been injected by a third party. This is because some users might legitimately desire
the content that is being added to web pages by the extensions they install. To wit,
it is primarily for this reason that a recent purge of extensions from the Chrome
Web Store did not encompass the entirety of the extensions that were identified as
suspicious in a previous study, as the third-party content modification could not be
clearly considered as malicious [117]. Instead, we claim that users themselves are best
positioned to make the determination as to whether third-party content modification
is desired or not. An approach that proceeds from this observation would provide
sufficient, easily comprehensible information to users in order to allow an informed
choice as to whether content is desirable or should be blocked. It should be noted
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that defending against drive-by downloads and general malware is not the focus of
this paper. Rather, the goal is to highlight injected ads to increase likelihood that
user will make an informed choice to not click on them.
We envision that OriginTracer could be used as a complementary approach
to existing techniques such as central approaches used by browser vendors. Also,
browser vendors can benefit from using our system in addition to end users to detect
the content modifications by extensions in a more precise and reliable way. In the
following sections, we present design and implementation of our system.
4.3 Design
In this section, we describe an in-browser approach for identifying third-party con-
tent modifications in web browsers. The approach adds fine-grained provenance
tracking to the browser, at the level of individual DOM elements. Provenance in-
formation is used in two ways: i) to distinguish between content that originates from
the web page publisher and content injected by an unassociated third party, and
ii) to indicate which third party (e.g., extension) is responsible for content modific-
ations using provenance indicators. By integrating the approach directly into the
browser, we guarantee the trustworthiness of both the provenance information and
the visual indicators. That is, as the browser is already part of the trusted com-
puting base (TCB) in the web security model, we leverage this as the appropriate
layer to compute precise, fine-grained provenance information. Similarly, the browser
holds sufficient information to ensure that provenance indicators cannot be tampered
58
with or occluded by malicious extensions. While we consider malicious or exploited
browser plug-ins such as Flash Player outside our threat model, we note that modern
browsers take great pains to isolate plug-ins in least privilege protection domains.
We report separately on the implementation of the approach in Section 4.4.
In the following, we present our approach to tracking and propagating content
provenance, and then discuss provenance indicators and remediation strategies.
4.3.1 Content Provenance
Web pages are composed of HTML that references resources such as stylesheets,
scripts, images, plug-ins such as Flash objects, or even other web pages loaded inside
frames. The document object model (DOM) is a natural structural representation of
a web page that can be manipulated through a standard API, and serves as a suitable
basis for provenance tracking. In particular, our system tracks the provenance of each
element e contained in a DOM. Provenance for a DOM element is recorded as a set
of labels ` ∈ P (L), where the set of all labels L corresponds to a generalization
of standard web origins to include extensions. That is, instead of the classic origin
3-tuple of 〈scheme, host, port〉, we record
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L = 〈S, I, P,X〉
S = {scheme} ∪ {“extension”}
I = {host} ∪ {extension-identifier}
P = {port} ∪ {null}
X = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
In other words, a label is a 4-tuple that consists of a normal network scheme or
extension, a network host or a unique extension identifier, a port or the special null
value, and an index used to impose a global total order on labels as described be-
low. While browsers use different extension identifiers, including randomly-generated
identifiers, the exact representation used is unimportant so long as there is a one-
to-one mapping between extensions and identifiers and their use is locally consistent
within the browser. An overview of provenance tracking is depicted in Figure 4.2.
4.3.1.1 Static Publisher Provenance
Content provenance tracking begins with a web page load. As the DOM is parsed
by the browser, each element is labeled with a singleton label set containing the
origin of the publisher, {l0}. Thus, static provenance tracking is straightforward and
equivalent to the standard use of origins as a browser security context.
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Figure 4.2: Element-granularity provenance tracking. (1) Content loaded directly
from the publisher is labeled with the publisher’s origin, l0. (2) An external script
reference to origin l1 is performed. (3) DOMmodifications from l1’s script are labeled
with the label set {l0, l1}. (4) Further external script loads and subsequent DOM
modifications induce updated label sets – e.g., {l0, l1, l2}. (5) A DOM modification
that originates from an extension produces provenance label sets {l0, l1, l2, l3} for the
element
4.3.1.2 Dynamic Publisher Provenance
Content provenance becomes more interesting in the presence of dynamic code exe-
cution. As JavaScript can add, modify, and remove DOM elements in an arbitrary
fashion using the DOM API exposed by the browser, it is necessary to track these
modifications in terms of provenance labels.
New provenance labels are created from the publisher’s label set {l0} as follows.
Whenever an external script is referenced from the initial DOM resulting from the
page load, a new label li, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is generated from the origin of the script. All
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subsequent DOM modifications that occur as a result of an external script loaded
from the initial DOM are recorded as {l0, li}. Successive external script loads fol-
low the expected inductive label generation process – i.e., three successive external
script loads from unique origins will result in a label set {l0, li, lj, lk}. Finally, la-
bel sets contain unique elements such that consecutive external script loads from a
previously accessed origin are not reflected in the label for subsequent DOM modi-
fications. For instance, if the web page publisher loads a script from the publisher’s
origin, then any resulting DOM modifications will have a provenance label set of
{l0} instead of {l0, l0}. Content provenance is propagated for three generic classes of
DOM operations: element insertion, modification, and deletion.
Element insertions produce an updated DOM that contains the new element
labeled with the current label set, and potentially generates a new label set if the in-
jected element is a script. Element modifications produce a DOM where the modified
element’s label set is merged with the current label set. Finally, element deletions
simply remove the element from the DOM.
4.3.1.3 Extension Provenance
The third and final form of provenance tracking concerns content modifications due
to DOM manipulations by extensions. In this case, provenance propagation follows
the semantics for the above case of dynamic publisher provenance. Where these
two cases differ, however, is in the provenance label initialization. While provenance
label sets for content that originates, perhaps indirectly, from the web page publisher
contains the publisher’s origin label l0, content that originates from an extension is
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rooted in a label set initialized with the extension’s label. In particular, content
modifications that originate from an extension are not labeled by the publisher’s
origin. An exception to this occurs when the extension, either directly or indirectly,
subsequently loads scripts from the publisher, or modifies an existing element that
originated from the publisher.
4.3.2 Content Provenance Indicators
With the fine-grained content provenance scheme described above, identifying the
principal responsible for DOM modifications is straightforward. For each element,
all that is required is to inspect its label set ` to check whether it contains the label
of any extension.
A related, but separate, question is how best to relay this information to the user.
In this design, several options are possible on a continuum from simply highlighting
injected content without specific provenance information to reporting the full ordered
provenance chain from the root to the most recent origin. The first option makes
no use of the provenance chain, while the other end of the spectrum is likely to
overwhelm most users with too much information, degrading the practical usefulness
of provenance tracking. We suspect that a reasonable balance between these two
extremes is a summarization of the full chain, for instance by reporting only the
label of the corresponding extension.
Finally, if a user decides that the third-party content modification is unwanted,
another design parameter is how to act upon this decision. Possible actions include
blocking specific element modifications, removing the offending extension, or report-
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ing its behavior to a central authority. We report on the specific design choices we
made with respect to provenance indicators in the presentation of our implementation
in Section 4.4.
4.4 Implementation
In this section, we presentOriginTracer, our prototype implementation for identi-
fying and highlighting extension-based web page content modifications. We imple-
mented OriginTracer as a set of modifications to the Chromium browser1. In
particular, we modified both Blink and the extension engine to track the provenance
of content insertion, modification, and removal according to the semantics presen-
ted in Section 4.3. These modifications also implement provenance indicators for
suspicious content that does not originate from the publisher. In total, our changes
consist of approximately 900 SLOC for C++ and several lines of JavaScript2. In
the following, we provide more detail on the integration of OriginTracer into
Chromium.
4.4.1 Tracking Publisher Provenance
A core component of OriginTracer is responsible for introducing and propagating
provenance label sets for DOM elements. In the following, we discuss the implement-
ation of provenance tracking for publisher content.
1https://github.com/sajjadium/OriginTracer
2SLOC were measured using David Wheeler’s SLOCCount [7].
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4.4.1.1 Tracking Static Elements
As discussed in Section 4.3, provenance label sets for static DOM elements that
comprise the HTML document sent by the publisher as part of the initial page
load are equivalent to the publisher’s web origin – in our notation, l0. Therefore,
minimal modifications to the HTML parser were necessary to introduce these element
annotations, which is performed in an incremental fashion as the page is parsed.
4.4.1.2 Tracking Dynamic Elements
To track dynamic content modifications, this component of OriginTracer must
also monitor JavaScript execution. When a script tag is encountered during parsing
of a page, Blink creates a new element and attaches it to the DOM. Then, Blink
obtains the JavaScript code (fetching it from network in the case of remote script
reference), submits the script to the V8 JavaScript engine for execution, and pauses
the parsing process until the script execution is finished. During execution of the
script, some new elements might be created dynamically and inserted into the DOM.
According to the provenance semantics, these new elements inherit the label set of
the script. In order to create new elements in JavaScript, one can i) use DOM APIs
to create a new element and attach it to the web page’s DOM, or ii) write HTML
tags directly into the page. In the first method, to create a new element object, a
canonical example is to provide the tag name to the createElement function. Then,
other attributes of the newly created element are set – e.g., after creating an element
object for an a tag, an address must be provided for its href attribute. Finally,
the new element should be attached to the DOM tree as a child using appendChild
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or insertBefore functions. In the second method, HTML is inserted directly into
the web page using the functions such as write and writeln, or by modifying the
innerHTML attribute. In cases where existing elements are modified (e.g., changing
an image’s src attribute), the element inherits the label set of the currently executing
script as well. In order to have a complete mediation of all DOM modifications to
Web page, several classes in Blink implementation were instrumented in order to
assign provenance label sets for newly created or modified elements using the label
set applied to the currently executing script.
4.4.1.3 Handling Events and Timers
An additional consideration for this OriginTracer component is modifications to
event handlers and timer registrations, as developers make heavy use of event and
timer callbacks in modern JavaScript. For instance, such callbacks are used to handle
user interface events such as clicking on elements, hovering over elements, or to sched-
ule code after a time interval has elapsed. In practice, this requires the registration
of callback handlers via addEventListener API for events, and setTimeout and
setInterval for timers. To mediate callbacks related to the addition and firing of
events and timers, we slightly modified the EventTarget and DOMTimer classes in
Blink, respectively. Specifically, we record the mapping between the running scripts
and their registered callback functions, and then recover the responsible scripts for
DOM modification during callback execution.
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4.4.2 Tracking Extension Provenance
Chromium’s extension engine is responsible for loading extensions, checking their
permissions against those declared in the manifest file, injecting content scripts, dis-
patching background scripts and content scripts to the V8 script engine for execution,
and providing a channel for communication between content scripts and background
page.
Chromium extensions can manipulate the web page’s content by injecting content
scripts into the web page or using the webRequest API. Content scripts are JavaS-
cript programs that can manipulate the web page using the shared DOM, communic-
ate with external servers via XMLHttpRequest, invoke a limited set of chrome.* APIs,
and interact with their owning extension’s background page. By using webRequest,
extensions are also able to modify and block HTTP requests and responses in order
to change the web page’s DOM.
In this work, we only track content modifications by content scripts and leave
identifying ad injection by webRequest for future engineering work. Prior work, how-
ever, has mentioned that only 5% of ad injection incidents occurred via webRequest;
instead, Chrome extensions mostly rely on content scripts to inject advertisements [117].
Moreover, with modern websites becoming more complex, injecting stealthy advert-
isement into the page using webRequest is not a trivial task.
4.4.2.1 Tracking Content Script Injection and Execution
To track elements created or modified during the execution of content scripts, ex-
tension engine was modified to hook events corresponding to script injection and
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execution. Content scripts can be inserted into the web page using different meth-
ods. If a content script should be injected into every matched web page, it must
be registered in the extension manifest file using the content_scripts field. By
providing different options for this field, one can control when and where the content
scripts be injected. Another method is programmatic injection, which is useful when
content scripts should be injected in response to specific events (e.g., a user clicks
the extension’s browser action). With programmatic injection, content scripts can
be injected using the tabs.executeScript API if the tabs permission is set in the
manifest file. Either way, content scripts have a provenance label set initialized with
the extension’s label upon injection.
4.4.2.2 Handling Callback Functions
Chromium’s extension engine provides a messaging API as a communication chan-
nel between the background page and the content scripts. The background page
and content scripts can receive messages from each other by providing a callback
function for the onMessage or onRequest events, and can send messages by invoking
sendMessage or sendRequest. To track the registration and execution of callback
functions, the send_request and event modules were slightly modified in the ex-
tension engine. Specifically, we added some code to map registered callbacks to their
corresponding content scripts in order to find the extension responsible for DOM
modification.
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4.4.3 Content Provenance Indicators
Given DOM provenance information, OriginTracer must first i) identify when
suspicious content modifications – e.g., extension-based ad injection – has occurred,
and additionally ii) communicate this information to the user in an easily compre-
hensible manner.
To implement the first requirement, our prototype monitors for content modi-
fications where a subtree of elements are annotated with label sets that contains a
particular extension’s label. This check can be performed efficiently by traversing the
DOM and inspecting element label sets after a set of changes have been performed
on the DOM.
There are several possible options to communicate content provenance as men-
tioned in Section 4.3. In our current prototype, provenance is indicated using a
configurable border color of the root element of the suspicious DOM subtree. This
border should be chosen to be visually distinct from the existing color palette of
the web page. Finally, a tooltip indicating the root label is displayed when the user
hovers their mouse over the DOM subtree. An example is shown in Figure 4.3. To
implement these features, OriginTracer modifies style and title attributes. In
addition, since OriginTracer highlights elements in an online fashion, it must
delay the addition of highlighting until the element is attached to the page’s DOM
and is displayed. Therefore, modifications were made to the ContainerNode class
that is responsible for attaching new elements to the DOM.
While we did not exhaustively explore the design space of content provenance in-
dicators in this work (e.g., selective blocking of extension-based DOM modifications),
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Figure 4.3: An example of indicator for an injected advertisement on amazon.com
website
we report on the usability of the prototype implementation in our evaluation.
4.5 Analysis
In this section, we measure the effectiveness, usability, and performance of content
provenance indicators using the OriginTracer prototype. In particular, the ques-
tions we aim to answer with this evaluation are:
(Q1) How susceptible are users to injected content such as third-party advertise-
ments? (§4.5.1.1)
(Q2) Do provenance indicators lead to a significant, measurable decrease in the
likelihood of clicking on third-party content that originates from extensions?
(§4.5.1.2)
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(Q3) Are users likely to use the system during their normal web browsing? (§4.5.2)
(Q4) Does integration of the provenance tracking system significantly degrade the
users’ browsing experience and performance of the browser on a representative
sample of websites? (§4.5.3)
Ethics. As part of the evaluation, we performed two experiments involving users
unaffiliated with the project as described below. Due to the potential risk to user
confidentiality and privacy, we formulated an experimental protocol that was ap-
proved by our university’s institutional review board (IRB). This protocol included
safeguards designed to prevent exposing sensitive user data such as account names,
passwords, personal addresses, and financial information, as well as to protect the an-
onymity of the study participants with respect to data storage and reporting. While
users were not initially told the purpose of some of the experiments, all users were
debriefed at the end of each trial as to the true purpose of the study.
4.5.1 Effectiveness
Similar to prior work [28], we performed a user study to measure the effectiveness of
content provenance in enabling users to more easily identify unwanted third-party
content. However, we performed the user study with a significantly larger group
of participants. The study population was composed of 80 students that represent
a range of technical sophistication. We conducted an initial briefing prior to the
experiments where we made it clear that we were interested in honest answers.
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4.5.1.1 User Susceptibility to Ad Injection
The goal of the first phase of the experiment was to measure whether users were able
to detect third-party content that was not intended for inclusion by the publishers
of web pages presented to them. Users were divided into two equal sized groups
of 40. In each group, users were first presented with three unmodified Chromium
browsers, each of which had a separate ad-injecting extension installed: Auto Zoom,
Alpha Finder, and X-Notifier for the first group, and Candy Zapper, uTorrent,
and Gethoneybadger for the second group. These extensions were chosen because
they exhibit a range of ad injection behaviors, from subtle injections that blend into
the publisher’s web page to very obvious pop-ups that are visually distinct from the
publisher’s content.
Using each browser, the participants were asked to visit three popular retail
websites: Amazon, Walmart, and Alibaba. Each ad-injecting extension monitors for
visits to these websites, and each injects three different types of advertisements into
these sites. For each website, we asked the participants to examine the page and tell
us if they noticed any content in the page that did not belong to the website – in
other words, whether any content did not seem to originate from the publisher. For
each group, we aggregated the responses and presented the percentage of correctly
reported ad injection incidents for each extension in Figure 4.4.
The results demonstrate that a significant number of Internet users often do not
recognize when ad injection occurs in the wild, even when told to look for foreign
content. For example, 34 participants did not recognize any injected ads out of the
three that were added to Amazon website by Auto Zoom extension. Comparatively
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of injected ads that are reported correctly by all the parti-
cipants
more users were able to identify ads injected by Alpha Finder and X-Notifier. We
suspect the reason for this is because these extensions make use of pop-up advertise-
ments that are easier to recognize as out-of-place. However, a significant number of
users nevertheless failed to note these pop-up ads, and even after prompting stated
that they thought these ads were part of the publisher’s content. More generally,
across all websites and extensions, many participants failed to identify any injected
ads whatsoever.
We then asked each participant whether they would click on ads in general to
measure the degree of trust that users put into the contents on the publisher’s page.
Specifically, we asked participants to rate the likelihood of clicking on ads on a scale
from one to five, where one means that they would never click on an ad while five
means that they would definitely click on an ad. We aggregated the responses and
present the results in Figure 4.5a.
These results show that a significant number of users, roughly half, would click
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Figure 4.5: User study results. For each boxplot, the box represents the boundaries
of the first and third quartiles. The band within each box is the median, while the
triangle is the mean. The whiskers represent 1.5 IQR boundaries, and outliers are
represented as a circle
on advertisements that might not originate from the publisher, but that were instead
injected by an extension. This demonstrates the effectiveness of ad injection as a
mechanism for diverting revenue from publishers to extension authors. It also shows
the potential effectiveness of malicious extensions in using content modifications to
expose users to traditional malware.
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4.5.1.2 Effectiveness of Content Provenance Indicators
After the first phase of the experiment, we briefly explained the purpose of Ori-
ginTracer and content provenance to the participants. Then, for each participant
in each group, we picked one of the three ad-injecting extensions in which, the par-
ticipant did not detect most of the injected ads and installed it on a Chromium
instance equipped with OriginTracer. Then, each participant was asked to visit
one of the three retail websites by his choice and identify third-party content modi-
fications – i.e., injected ads – with the help of provenance indicators. The results
(normalized to [0, 1]) for unassisted and assisted identification of injected ads are
shown in Figure 4.5c and Figure 4.5d, respectively. Unassisted identification is the
aggregated number of reported ad injections without any assistance in the presence
of three ad-injecting extensions across three retail websites, and assisted identific-
ation is the number of reported injected ads with the help of content provenance
indicators.
These results clearly imply that users are more likely to recognize the presence
of third-party content modifications using provenance indicators. To confirm stat-
istical significance, we performed a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that
provenance indicators do not assist in identifying third-party content modifications,
while the alternative hypothesis is that provenance indicators do assist in identifying
such content. Using a paired t-test, we obtain a p-value of 4.9199×10−7, sufficient to
reject the null hypothesis at a 1% significance level. The outliers in assisted identi-
fication are due to the fact that our ad highlighting technique was not identifiable by
a small number of participants. We believe that using different visual highlighting
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techniques would make it easier for users to identify the injected ads.
Finally, we asked each participant how likely they would be to use the content
provenance system in their daily web browsing. We asked participants to rate this
likelihood on a scale from one to five, where one means they would never use the
system and five means that they would always use it. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 4.5b, and indicate that most users would be willing to use a content provenance
system. The reason behind the outliers is because a few of the participants stated
that they do not need our system since they would not click on any advertisements.
However, we note that it can be difficult to distinguish between advertisements and
other legitimate content (e.g., products in retail sites) and, consequently, users might
be lured into clicking on ad content injected by extensions.
4.5.1.3 Summary
From this user study, we draw several conclusions. First, we confirm that in many
cases users are unable to distinguish injected third-party content from publisher con-
tent. We also show that because users place trust in publishers, they will often click
on injected ads, and thus they tend to be susceptible to ad injection. Our data
shows that content provenance assists in helping users distinguish between trusted
publisher content and injected third-party content that should not be trusted. Fi-
nally, we show that many users would be willing to use the system based on their
experience in this study.
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4.5.2 Usability
We conducted another experiment on a separate population of users to measure the
usability of the OriginTracer prototype. The user population was composed of
13 students with different technical background. We presented the participants with
OriginTracer integrated into Chromium 43, and asked them to browse the web for
several hours, visiting any websites of their choice. For privacy reasons, however, we
asked users to avoid browsing websites that require a login or that involve sensitive
subject matter (e.g., adult or financial websites). In addition, for each user, we
randomly selected 50 websites from the Alexa Top 500 that satisfy our user privacy
constraints and asked the user to visit them. In particular, each participant was
asked to browse at least three levels down from the home page and visit external
links contained in each site. Finally, to gain some assurance that OriginTracer
would not break benign extensions, we configured the browser with the five high-
profile extensions list in Table 4.1.
During the browsing session, the browser was modified to record the number of
URLs visited. We also asked participants to record the number of pages in which
they encountered one of two types of errors. Type I errors are those where the
browser crashed, system error messages were displayed, pages would not load, or
the website was completely unusable for some other reason. Type II errors include
non-catastrophic errors that impact usability but did not preclude it – e.g., the page
took an abnormally long time to load, or the appearance of the page was not as
expected. We also asked users to report any broken functionality for the benign
extensions described above as well.
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Out of close to 2,000 URLs, two catastrophic errors and 27 non-catastrophic
errors were encountered. However, we note that the majority of URLs rendered
and executed correctly. In addition, none of the participants reported any broken
extensions. We therefore conclude that the proposed approach is compatible with
modern browsers and benign extensions, and further work would very likely allow
the prototype to execute completely free of errors.
4.5.3 Performance
To measure the performance overhead of OriginTracer, we configured both an
unmodified Chromium browser and the prototype to automatically visit the Alexa
Top 1K. The Alexa Top 1K covers many popular websites and is weighted towards
being representative of the sites that people use most often. By using this test
set, we ensured that each browser visited a broad spectrum of websites that in-
clude both static and dynamic content, and especially websites that make heavy
use of third-party components and advertisements. Moreover, we configured both
browser instances with the five benign extensions discussed in Section 4.2 that change
the DOM to measure performance in the presence of extensions. A more detailed
evaluation would analyze more pages on these websites to garner a more realistic
representation, but that is beyond the scope of the current work.
We built a crawler based on Selenium [107] to automatically visit the entire list
of websites and recorded the total elapsed time from the beginning of the browsing
process until the entire list of websites was visited. Specifically, our crawler moves
to the next website in the list when the current website is fully loaded, signified by
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the firing of the onload event. In order to account for fluctuations in browsing time
due to network delays and the dynamic nature of advertisements, we repeated the
experiment 10 times and measured the average elapsed time. The average elapsed
time for browsing the home pages of the Alexa Top 1K websites measured in this way
is 3,457 seconds for the unmodified browser and 3,821 seconds for OriginTracer.
Therefore, OriginTracer incurred a 10.5% overhead on browsing time on average.
We also measured the delay imposed by OriginTracer on startup time by launch-
ing the browser 10 times and measuring the average launch time. OriginTracer
did not cause any measurable overhead on startup time.
While this overhead is not insignificant, we note that our user study in Sec-
tion 4.5.2 indicates that many users would be willing to trade off actual perceived per-
formance overhead against the security benefits provided by the system. Moreover,
this prototype is just a proof-of-concept implementation of our system and there is
still room for optimizing the implementation to decrease the page load time.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated a prototype implementation of web content provenance
tracking, a modified version of Chromium we call OriginTracer, through a user
study that demonstrated a statistically significant improvement in the ability of
users to identify unwanted third-party content. Our performance evaluation shows
a modest overhead on a large representative sample of popular websites, while our
user experiments indicate that users are willing to trade off a slight decrease in
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performance for more insight into the sources of web content that they browse. We
also performed a comprehensive study on the content modifications performed by
ad-injecting extensions in the wild.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Style Injection by
Relative Path Overwrite
5.1 Introduction
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [94] attacks are one of the most common threats on the
Web. While XSS has traditionally been understood as the attacker’s capability to
inject script into a site and have it executed by the victim’s web browser, more recent
work has shown that script injection is not a necessary precondition for effective
attacks. By injecting Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) directives, for instance, attackers
can carry out so-called scriptless attacks [47] and exfiltrate secrets from a site.
The aforementioned injection attacks typically arise due to the lack of separa-
tion between code and data [31], and more specifically, insufficient sanitization of
untrusted inputs in web applications. While script injection attacks are more power-
81
ful than those based on style injection, they are also more well-known as a threat,
and web developers are comparatively more likely to take steps to make them more
difficult. From an attacker’s point of view, style injection attacks may be an option
in scenarios where script injection is not possible.
There are many existing techniques of how style directives could be injected
into a site [47, 53]. A relatively recent class of attacks is Relative Path Overwrite
(RPO), first proposed in a blog post by Gareth Heyes [50] in 2014. These attacks
exploit the semantic disconnect between web browsers and web servers in interpreting
relative paths (path confusion). More concretely, in certain settings an attacker can
manipulate a page’s URL in such a way that the web server still returns the same
content as for the benign URL. However, using the manipulated URL as the base,
the web browser incorrectly expands relative paths of included resources, which can
lead to resources being loaded despite not being intended to be included by the
developer. Depending on the implementation of the site, different variations of RPO
attacks may be feasible. For example, an attacker could manipulate the URL to make
the page include user-generated content hosted on the same domain [116]. When an
injection vulnerability is present in a page, an attacker could manipulate the URL
such that the web page references itself as the stylesheet, which turns a simple text
injection vulnerability into a style sink [50]. Among these attack instantiations, the
latter variant has preconditions that are comparatively frequently met by sites. Our
work focuses on this variant of RPO.
In this chapter, we present the first in-depth study of style injection vulnerability
using RPO. We extract pages using relative-path stylesheets from the Common Crawl
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dataset [26], automatically test if style directives can be injected using RPO, and
determine whether they are interpreted by the browser. Out of 31 million pages from
222 thousand Alexa Top 1M sites [13] in the Common Crawl that use relative-path
stylesheets, we find that 377 k pages (12 k sites) are vulnerable; 11 k pages on 1 k sites
can be exploited in Chrome, and nearly 55 k pages on over 3 k sites can be exploited
in Internet Explorer.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the necessary
background on cross-site scripting, scriptless attacks, and relative path overwrite.
Section 5.3 presents the design and implementation of our measurement methodo-
logy, while Section 5.4 presents our findings. Finally, we summarize the chapter in
Section 5.5.
5.2 Background
The general threat model of Relative Path Overwrite (RPO) resembles that of Cross-
Site Scripting (XSS). Typically, the attacker’s goal is to steal sensitive information
from a third-party site or make unauthorized transactions on the site, such as gaining
access to confidential financial information or transferring money out of a victim’s
account.
The attacker carries out the attack against the site indirectly, by way of a victim
that is an authorized user of the site. The attacker can trick the victim into following
a crafted link, such as when the victim visits a domain under the attacker’s control
and the page automatically opens the manipulated link, or through search engine
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poisoning, deceptive shortened links, or through means of social engineering.
5.2.1 Cross-Site Scripting
Many sites have vulnerabilities that let attackers inject malicious script. Dynamic
sites frequently accept external inputs that can be controlled by an attacker, such
as data in URLs, cookies, or forms. While the site developer’s aim would have been
to render the input as text, lack of proper sanitization can result in the input being
executed as script [97]. The inclusion of unsanitized inputs could occur on the server
side or client side, and in a persistent stored or volatile reflected way [94]. To the
victim’s web browser, the code appears as originating from the first-party site, thus it
is given full access to the session data in the victim’s browser. Thereby, the attacker
bypasses protections of the Same-Origin Policy.
5.2.2 Scriptless Attacks
Cross-Site Scripting is perhaps the most well-known web-based attack, against which
many sites defend by filtering user input. Client-side security mechanisms such as
browser-based XSS filters [16] and Content Security Policy [110, 120] also make it
more challenging for attackers to exploit injection vulnerabilities for XSS. This has
led attackers (and researchers) to investigate potential alternatives, such as scriptless
attacks. These attacks allow sniffing users’ browsing histories [74, 55], exfiltrating
arbitrary content [62], reading HTML attributes [49, 65], and bypassing Clickjacking
defenses [49]. In the following, we highlight two types of scriptless attacks proposed
in the literature. Both assume that an attacker cannot inject or execute script into a
84
site. Instead, the attacker abuses features related to Cascading Style Sheets (CSS).
Heiderich et al. [47] consider scenarios where an attacker can inject CSS into
the context of the third-party page so that the style directives are interpreted by
the victim’s browser when displaying the page. That is, the injection sink is either
located inside a style context, or the attacker can inject markup to create a style
context around the malicious CSS directives. While the CSS standard is intended
for styling and layout purposes such as defining sizes, colors, or background images
and as such does not contain any traditional scripting capabilities, it does provide
some context-sensitive features that, in combination, can be abused to extract and
exfiltrate data. If the secret to be extracted is not displayed, such as a token in
a hidden form field or link URL, the attacker can use the CSS attribute accessor
and content property to extract the secret and make it visible as text, so that style
directives can be applied to it. Custom attacker-supplied fonts can change the size
of the secret text depending on its value. Animation features can be used to cycle
through a number of fonts in order to test different combinations. Media queries or
the appearance of scrollbars can be used to implement conditional style, and data
exfiltration by loading a different URL for each condition from the attacker’s server.
Taken together, Heiderich et al. demonstrate that these techniques allow an attacker
to steal credit card numbers or CSRF tokens [96] without script execution.
Rather than using layout-based information leaks to exfiltrate data from a page,
Huang et al. [53] show how syntactically lax parsing of CSS can be abused to
make browsers interpret an HTML page as a “stylesheet.” The attack assumes
that the page contains two injection sinks, one before and one after the location
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of the secret in the source code. The attacker injects two CSS fragments such as
{}*{background:url(’//attacker.com/? and ’);}, which make the secret a part
of the URL that will be loaded from the attacker’s server when the directive is
interpreted. It is assumed that the attacker cannot inject markup, thus the injec-
ted directive is not interpreted as style when the site is conventionally opened in
a browser. However, the CSS standard mandates that browsers be very forgiving
when parsing CSS, skipping over parts they do not understand [119]. In practice,
this means that an attacker can set up a site that loads the vulnerable third-party
site as a stylesheet. When the victim visits the attacker’s site while logged in, the
victim’s browser loads the third-party site and interprets the style directive, causing
the secret to be sent to the attacker. To counter this attack, modern browsers do not
load documents with non-CSS content types and syntax errors as stylesheets when
they originate from a different domain than the including page. Yet, attacks based
on tolerant CSS parsing are still feasible when both the including and the included
page are loaded from the same domain. Relative Path Overwrite attacks can abuse
such a scenario [129].
5.2.3 Relative Path Overwrite
Relative Path Overwrite vulnerabilities can occur in sites that use relative paths to
include resources such as scripts or stylesheets. Before a web browser can issue a
request for such a resource to the server, it must expand the relative path into an ab-
solute URL. For example, assume that a web browser has loaded an HTML document
from http://example.com/rpo/test.php which references a remote stylesheet with
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the relative path dist/styles.css. Web browsers treat URLs as file system-like
paths, that is, test.php would be assumed to be a file within the parent directory
rpo/, which would be used as the starting point for relative paths, resulting in the
absolute URL http://example.com/rpo/dist/styles.css.
However, the browser’s interpretation of the URL may be very different from how
the web server resolves the URL to determine which resource should be returned to
the browser. The URL may not correspond to an actual server-side file system struc-
ture at all, or the web server may internally rewrite parts of the URL. For instance,
when a web server receives a request for http://example.com/rpo/test.php/ with
an added trailing slash, it may still return the same HTML document corresponding
to the test.php resource. Yet, to the browser this URL would appear to designate
a directory (without a file name component), thus the browser would request the
stylesheet from http://example.com/rpo/test.php/dist/styles.css. Depend-
ing on the server configuration, this may either result in an error since no such file
exists, or the server may interpret dist/styles.css as a parameter to the script
test.php and return the HTML document. In the latter case, the HTML document
includes itself as a stylesheet. Provided that the document contains a (text) injec-
tion vulnerability, attackers can carry out the scriptless attacks; since the stylesheet
inclusion is same-origin, the document load is permitted.
5.2.4 Preconditions for RPO Style Attacks
For the purpose of this work, we focus on a generic type of RPO attack because its
preconditions are less specific and are likely met by a larger number of sites. More
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formally, we define a page as vulnerable if:
• The page includes at least one stylesheet using a relative path.
• The server is set up to serve the same page even if the URL is manipulated by
appending characters that browsers interpret as path separators.
• The page reflects style directives injected into the URL or cookie. Note that
the reflection can occur in an arbitrary location within the page, and markup
or script injection are not necessary.
• The page does not contain a <base> HTML tag before relative paths that
would let the browser know how to correctly expand them.
This attack corresponds to style injection by means of a page that references itself
as a stylesheet (PRSSI). Since the “stylesheet” self-reference is, in fact, an HTML
document, web servers would typically return it with a text/html content type.
Browsers in standards-compliant mode do not attempt to parse documents with a
content type other than CSS even if referenced as a stylesheet, causing the attack to
fail. However, web browsers also support quirks mode for backwards compatibility
with non-standards compliant sites [108]; in this mode, browsers ignore the content
type and parse the document according to the inclusion context only.
We define a vulnerable page as exploitable if the injected style is interpreted by
the browser–that is, if an attacker can force browsers to render the page in quirks
mode. This can occur in two alternative ways:
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• The vulnerable HTML page specifies a document type that causes the browser
to use quirks mode instead of standards mode. The document type indicates
the HTML version and dialect used by the page; Section 5.4.3.1 provides details
on how the major web browsers interpret the document types we encountered
during our study.
• Even if the page specifies a document type that would usually result in stand-
ards mode being used, quirks mode parsing can often be enforced in Internet
Explorer [61]. Framed documents inherit the parsing mode from the parent
document, thus an attacker can create an attack page with an older docu-
ment type and load the vulnerable page into a frame. This trick only works in
Internet Explorer, however, and it may fail if the vulnerable page uses any anti-
framing technique, or if it specifies an explicit value for the X-UA-Compatible
HTTP header (or equivalent).
Our measurement methodology in Section 5.3 tests how often these preconditions
hold in the wild in order to quantify the vulnerability and exploitability of pages with
respect to RPO attacks.
5.3 Methodology
Our methodology consists of three main phases. We seed our system with pages
from the Common Crawl archive to extract candidate pages that include at least
one stylesheet using a relative path. To determine whether these candidate pages
are vulnerable, we attempt to inject style directives by requesting variations of each
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page’s URL to cause path confusion and test whether the generated response reflects
the injected style directives. Finally, we test how often vulnerable pages can be
exploited by checking whether the reflected style directives are parsed and used for
rendering in a web browser.
Ethics. One ethical concern is that the injected CSS might be stored on the server
instead of being reflected in the response, and it could break sites as a result. We
took several cautionary steps in order to minimize any damaging side effects on sites
we probed. First, we did not try to login to the site, and we only tested RPO on
the publicly available version of the page. In addition, we only requested pages by
tainting different parts of the URL, and did not submit any forms. Moreover, we did
not click on any button or link in the page in order to avoid triggering JavaScript
events. These steps significantly decrease the chances that injected CSS will be
stored on the server. In order to minimize the damaging side effects in case our
injected CSS was stored, the injected CSS is not a valid style directive, and even
if it is stored on the server, it will not have any observable effect on the page. In
addition, experiment resulted in the discovery of vulnerable content management
systems (CMSes) used world-wide, and we contacted them so they can fix the issue.
We believe the real-world experiments that we conducted were necessary in order to
measure the risk posed by these vulnerabilities and inform site owners of potential
risks to their users.
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5.3.1 Candidate Identification
For finding the initial seed set of candidate pages with relative-path stylesheets,
we leverage the Common Crawl from August 2016, which contains more than 1.6
billion pages. By using an existing dataset, we can quickly identify candidate pages
without creating any web crawl traffic. We use a Java HTML parser to filter any
pages containing only inline CSS or stylesheets referenced by absolute URLs, leaving
us with over 203 million pages on nearly 6 million sites. For scalability purposes, we
further reduce the set of candidate pages in two steps:
1. We retain only pages from sites listed in the Alexa Top 1 million ranking, which
reduces the number of candidate pages to 141 million pages on 223 thousand
sites. In doing so, we bias our result toward popular sites–that is, sites where
attacks could have a larger impact because of the higher number of visitors.
2. We observed that many sites use templates customized through query strings
or path parameters. We expect these templates to cause similar vulnerability
and exploitability behavior for their instantiations, thus we can speed up our
detection by grouping URLs using the same template, and testing only one
random representative of each group.
In order to group pages, we replace all the values of query parameters with con-
stants, and we also replace any number identifier in the path with a constant.
We group pages that have the same abstract URL as well as the same document
type in the Common Crawl dataset. Table 5.1 illustrates this process.
Since our methodology contains a step during which we actively test whether a
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Table 5.1: Sample URL grouping.
Group By URL
Query Parameter http://example.com/?lang=enhttp://example.com/?lang=fr
Path Parameter http://example.com/028http://example.com/142
vulnerability can be exploited, we remove from the candidate set all pages hosted on
sites in .gov, .mil, .army, .navy, and .airforce. The final candidate set consists
of 137 million pages (31 million page groups) on 222 thousand sites.
5.3.2 Vulnerability Detection
To determine whether a candidate page is vulnerable, we implemented a lightweight
crawler based on the Python Requests API. At a high level, the crawler simulates how
a browser expands relative paths and tests whether style directives can be injected
into the resources loaded as stylesheets using path confusion.
For each page group from the candidate set, the crawler randomly selects one
representative URL and mutates it according to a number of techniques explained
below. Each of these techniques aims to cause path confusion and taints page in-
puts with a style directive containing a long unique, random string. The crawler
requests the mutated URL from the server and parses the response document, ignor-
ing resources loaded in frames. If the response contains a <base> tag, the crawler
considers the page not vulnerable since the <base> tag, if used correctly, can avoid
path confusion. Otherwise, the crawler extracts all relative stylesheet paths from the
response and expands them using the mutated URL of the main page as the base,
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emulating how browsers treat relative paths (see Section 5.2.3). The crawler then
requests each unique stylesheet URL until one has been found to reflect the injected
style in the response.
The style directive we inject to test for reflection vulnerabilities is shown in the
legend of Figure 5.1. The payload begins with an encoded newline character, as
we observed that the presence of a newline character increases the probability of a
successful injection. We initially use %0A as the newline character, but also test %0C
and %0D in case of unsuccessful injection. The remainder of the payload emulates
the syntax of a simple CSS directive and mainly consists of a randomly generated
string used to locate the payload in the body of the server response. If the crawler
finds a string match of the injected unique string, it considers the page vulnerable.
In the following, we describe the various URL mutation techniques we use to
inject style directives. All techniques also use RPO so that instead of the original
stylesheet files, browsers load different resources that are more likely to contain an
injection vulnerability. Conceptually, the RPO approaches we use assume some
form of server-side URL rewriting as described in Section 5.2.3. That is, the server
internally resolves a crafted URL to the same script as the “clean” URL. Under that
assumption, the path confusion caused by RPO would result in the page referencing
itself as the stylesheet when loaded in a web browser. However, this assumption is
only conceptual and not necessary for the attack to succeed. For servers that do
not internally rewrite URLs, our mutated URLs likely cause error responses since
the URLs do not correspond to actual files located on these servers. Error responses
are typically HTML documents and may contain injection sinks, such as when they
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display the URL of the file that could not be found. As such, server-generated error
responses can be used for the attack in the same way as regular pages.
Our URL mutation techniques differ in how they attempt to cause path confusion
and inject style directives by covering different URL conventions used by a range of
web application platforms.
5.3.2.1 Path Parameter
A number of web frameworks such as PHP, ASP, or JSP can be configured to use
URL schemes that encode script input parameters as a directory-like string following
the name of the script in the URL. Figure 5.1a shows a generic example where there
is no parameter in the URL. Since the crawler does not know the name of valid
parameters, it simply appends the payload as a subdirectory to the end of the URL.
In this case, content injection can occur if the page reflects the page URL or referrer
into the response. Note that in the example, we appended two slashes so that the
browser does not remove the payload from the URL when expanding the stylesheet
reference to the parent directory (../style.css). In the actual crawl, we always
appended twenty slashes to avoid having to account for different numbers of parent
directories. We did not observe relative paths using large numbers of ../ to reference
stylesheets, thus we are confident that twenty slashes suffice for our purposes.
Different web frameworks handle path parameters slightly differently, which is
why we distinguish a few additional cases. If parameters are present in the URL,
we can distinguish these cases based on a number of regular expressions that we
generated. For example, parameters can be separated by slashes (Figure 5.1b, PHP
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http :// domain/dir/page.asp
http :// domain/dir/page.asp/PAYLOAD //
http :// domain/dir/page.asp/PAYLOAD/style.css
(a) Path Parameter (Simple)
http :// domain/page.php/param
http :// domain/page.php/PAYLOAD param //
http :// domain/page.php/PAYLOAD param/style.css
(b) Path Parameter (PHP or ASP)
http :// domain/dir/page.jsp;param
http :// domain/dir/page.jsp;PAYLOAD param//
http :// domain/dir/page.jsp;PAYLOAD param/style.css
(c) Path Parameter (JSP)
http :// domain/dir/page.aspx
http :// domain/PAYLOAD /..%2Fdir/PAYLOAD /..%2Fpage.aspx//
http :// domain/PAYLOAD /..%2Fdir/PAYLOAD /..%2Fpage.aspx/style.css
(d) Encoded Path
http :// domain/dir/page.html?key=value
http :// domain/dir/page.html%3Fkey=PAYLOAD value//
http :// domain/dir/page.html%3Fkey=PAYLOAD value/style.css
(e) Encoded Query
http :// domain/dir/page.php?key=value
http :// domain/dir/page.php//?key=value
http :// domain/dir/page.php/style.css
Original Cookie: name=val
Crafted Cookie: name=PAYLOAD val
(f) Cookie
Figure 5.1: Various techniques of path confusion and style injection. In each ex-
ample, the first URL corresponds to the regular page, and the second one to the page
URL crafted by the attacker. Each HTML page is assumed to reference a stylesheet
at ../style.css, resulting in the browser expanding the stylesheet path as shown in
the third URL. PAYLOAD corresponds to %0A{}body{background:NONCE} (sim-
plified), where NONCE is a randomly generated string.
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or ASP) or semicolons ( Figure 5.1c, JSP). When the crawler detects one of these
known schemes, it injects the payload into each parameter. Consequently, in addition
to URL and referrer reflection, injection can also be successful when any of the
parameters is reflected in the page.
5.3.2.2 Encoded Path
This technique targets web servers such as IIS that decode encoded slashes in the
URL for directory traversal, whereas web browsers do not. Specifically, we use %2F,
an encoded version of ‘/’, to inject our payload into the URL in such a way that the
canonicalized URL is equal to the original page URL (see Figure 5.1d). Injection
using this technique succeeds if the page reflects the page URL or referrer into its
output.
5.3.2.3 Encoded Query
Similar to the technique above, we replace the URL query delimiter ‘?’ with its
encoded version %3F so that web browsers do not interpret it as such. In addition, we
inject the payload into every value of the query string, as can be seen in Figure 5.1e.
CSS injection happens if the page reflects either the URL, referrer, or any of the
query values in the HTML response.
5.3.2.4 Cookie
Since stylesheets referenced by a relative path are located in the same origin as the
referencing page, its cookies are sent when requesting the stylesheet. CSS injection
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may be possible if an attacker can create new cookies or tamper with existing ones (a
strong assumption compared to the other techniques), and if the page reflects cookie
values in the response. As shown in Figure 5.1f, the URL is only modified by adding
slashes to cause path confusion. The payload is injected into each cookie value and
sent by the crawler as an HTTP header.
5.3.3 Exploitability Detection
Once a page has been found to be vulnerable to style injection using RPO, the
final step is to verify whether the reflected CSS in the response is evaluated by a
real browser. To do so, we built a crawler based on Google Chrome, and used the
Remote Debugging Protocol [11] to drive the browser and record HTTP requests
and responses. In addition, we developed a Chrome extension to populate the cookie
header in CSS stylesheet requests with our payload.
In order to detect exploitable pages, we crawled all the pages from the previous
section that had at least one reflection. Specifically, for each page we checked which
of the techniques in Figure 5.1 led to reflection, and crafted the main URL with a
CSS payload. The CSS payload used to verify exploitability is different from the
simple payload used to test reflection. Specifically, the style directive is prefixed
with a long sequence of } and ] characters to close any preceding open curly braces
or brackets that may be located in the source code of the page, since they might
prevent the injected style directive from being parsed correctly. The style directive
uses a randomly-generated URL to load a background image for the HTML body. We
determine whether the injected style is evaluated by checking the browser’s network
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traffic for an outgoing HTTP request for the image.
5.3.3.1 Overriding Document Types
Reflected CSS is not always interpreted by the browser. One possible explanation is
the use of a modern document type in the page, which does not cause the browser
to render the page in quirks mode. Under certain circumstances, Internet Explorer
allows a parent page to force the parsing mode of a framed page into quirks mode [61].
To test how often this approach succeeds in practice, we also crawled vulnerable
pages with Internet Explorer 11 by framing them while setting X-UA-Compatible to
IE=EmulateIE7 via a meta tag in the attacker’s page.
5.3.4 Limitations
RPO is a class of attacks and our methodology covers only a subset of them. We
target RPO for the purpose of style injection using an HTML page referencing itself
(or, accidentally, an error page) as the stylesheet. In terms of style injection, our
crawler only looks for reflection, not stored injection of style directives. Furthermore,
manual analysis of a site might reveal more opportunities for style injection that our
crawler fails to detect automatically.
For efficiency reasons, we seed our analysis with an existing Common Crawl
dataset. We do not analyze the vulnerability of pages not contained in the Common
Crawl seed, which means that we do not cover all sites, and we do not fully cover all
pages within a site. Consequently, the results presented in this paper should be seen
as a lower bound. If desired, our methodology can be applied to individual sites in
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Table 5.2: Narrowing down the Common Crawl to the candidate set used in our
analysis (from left to right)
Relative CSS Alexa Top 1M Candidate Set
All Pages 203,609,675 141,384,967 136,793,450
Tested Pages 53,725,270 31,448,446 30,991,702
Sites 5,960,505 223,212 222,443
Doc. Types 9,833 2,965 2,898
order to analyze more pages.
5.4 Analysis
For the purposes of our analysis, we gradually narrow down the seed data from the
Common Crawl to pages using relative style paths in the Alexa Top 1M, reflect-
ing injected style directives under RPO, and being exploitable due to quirks mode
rendering.
Table 5.2 shows a summary of our dataset. Tested Pages refers to the set of
randomly selected pages from the page groups as discussed in Section 5.3.1. For
brevity, we are referring to Tested Pages wherever we mention pages in the remainder
of the paper.
5.4.1 Relative Stylesheet Paths
To assess the extent to which our Common Crawl-seeded candidate set covers sites
of different popularity, consider the hatched bars in Figure 5.2. Six out of the ten
largest sites according to Alexa are represented in our candidate set. That is, they are
contained in the Common Crawl, and have relative style paths. The figure shows that
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of the Alexa site ranking in our candidate set (exponentially
increasing bucket size).
our candidate set contains a higher fraction of the largest sites and a lower fraction of
the smaller sites. Consequently, our results better represent the most popular sites,
which receive most visitors, and most potential victims of RPO attacks.
While all the pages in the candidate set contain at least one relative stylesheet
path, Figure 5.3 shows that 63.1% of them contain multiple relative paths, which
increases the chances of finding a successful RPO and style injection point.
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Figure 5.3: CDF of total and maximum number of relative stylesheets per web page
and site, respectively.
5.4.2 Vulnerable Pages
We consider a candidate page vulnerable if one of the style injection techniques of
Section 5.3.2 succeeds. In other words, the server’s response should reflect the injec-
ted payload. Furthermore, we conservatively require that the response not contain a
base tag since a correctly configured base tag can prevent path confusion.
Table 5.3 shows that 1.2% of pages are vulnerable to at least one of the injec-
tion techniques, and 5.4% of sites contain at least one vulnerable page. The path
parameter technique is most effective against pages, followed by the encoded query
and the encoded path techniques. Sites that are ranked higher according to Alexa
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Table 5.3: Vulnerable pages and sites in the candidate set
Technique Pages Sites
Path Parameter 309,079 (1.0%) 9,136 (4.1%)
Encoded Path 53,502 (0.2%) 1,802 (0.8%)
Encoded Query 89,757 (0.3%) 1,303 (0.6%)
Cookie 15,656 (<0.1%) 1,030 (0.5%)
Total 377,043 (1.2%) 11,986 (5.4%)
are more likely to be vulnerable, as shown in Figure 5.2, where vulnerable and ex-
ploitable sites are relative to the candidate set in each bucket. While one third of
the candidate set in the Top 10 (two out of six sites) is vulnerable, the percentage
oscillates between 8 and 10% among the Top 100 k. The candidate set is dominated
by the smaller sites in the ranks between 100 k and 1M, which have a vulnerability
rate of 4.9% and push down the average over the entire ranking.
A base tag in the server response can prevent path confusion because it indicates
how the browser should expand relative paths. We observed a number of inconsist-
encies with respect to its use. At first, 603 pages on 60 sites contained a base tag in
their response; however, the server response after injecting our payload did not con-
tain the tag anymore, rendering these pages potentially exploitable. Furthermore,
Internet Explorer’s implementation of the base tag appears to be broken. When such
a tag is present, Internet Explorer fetches two URLs for stylesheets—one expanded
according to the base URL specified in the tag, and one expanded in the regular,
potentially “confused” way of using the page URL as the base. In our experiments,
Internet Explorer always applied the “confused” stylesheet, even when the one based
on the base tag URL loaded faster. Consequently, base tags do not appear to be an
effective defense against RPO in Internet Explorer (They seem to work as expected
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Table 5.4: Exploitable pages and sites in the candidate set (IE using framing)
Technique Chrome Internet Explorer
Pages Sites Pages Sites
Path Parameter 6,048 (<0.1%) 1,025 (0.5%) 52,344 (0.2%) 3,433 (1.5%)
Encoded Path 3 (<0.1%) 2 (<0.1%) 24 (<0.1%) 5 (<0.1%)
Encoded Query 23 (<0.1%) 20 (<0.1%) 137 (<0.1%) 43 (<0.1%)
Cookie 4,722 (<0.1%) 81 (<0.1%) 2,447 (<0.1%) 238 (0.1%)
Total 10,781 (<0.1%) 1,106 (0.5%) 54,853 (0.2%) 3,645 (1.6%)
in other browsers, including Edge).
5.4.3 Exploitable Pages
To test whether a vulnerable page was exploitable, we opened it in Chrome, injected
a style payload with an image reference (randomly generated URL), and checked
if the image was indeed loaded. This test succeeded for 2.9% of vulnerable pages;
0.5% of sites in the candidate set had at least one exploitable page (Table 5.4).
In the following, we explore various factors that may impact whether a vulnerable
page can be exploited, and we show how some of these partial defenses can be
bypassed.
5.4.3.1 Document Types
HTML document types play a significant role in RPO-based style injection attacks
because browsers typically parse resources with a non-CSS content type in a CSS
context only when the page specifies an ancient or non-standard HTML document
type (or none at all). The pages in our candidate set contain a total of 4,318 distinct
document types. However, the majority of these unique document types are not
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Table 5.5: Quirks mode document types by browser
Browser Version OS Doc. Types
Chrome 55 Ubuntu 16.04 1,378 (31.9%)
Opera 42 Ubuntu 16.04 1,378 (31.9%)
Safari 10 macOS Sierra 1,378 (31.9%)
Firefox 50 Ubuntu 16.04 1,326 (30.7%)
Edge 38 Windows 10 1,319 (30.5%)
IE 11 Windows 7 1,319 (30.5%)
standardized and differ from the standardized ones only by small variations, such as
forgotten spaces or misspellings.
To determine how browsers interpret these document types (i.e., whether they
cause them to render a page in standards or quirks mode), we designed a controlled
experiment. For each unique document type, we set up a local page with a relative
stylesheet path and carried out an RPO attack to inject CSS using a payload similar
to what we described in Section 5.3.3. We automatically opened the local page in
Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Internet Explorer, Safari, and Opera, and we kept track
of which document type caused the injected CSS to be parsed and the injected
background image to be downloaded.
Table 5.5 contains the results of this experiment. Even though the exact numbers
vary among browsers, roughly a third of the unique document types we encountered
result in quirks mode rendering. Not surprisingly, both Microsoft products Edge and
Internet Explorer exhibit identical results, whereas the common Webkit ancestry of
Chrome, Opera, and Safari also show identical results. Overall, 1,271 (29.4%) of
the unique document types force all the browsers into quirks mode, whereas 1,378
(31.9%) of them cause at least one browser to use quirks mode rendering. Table 5.6
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Table 5.6: Most frequent document types causing all browsers to render in quirks
mode, as well as the sites that use at least one such document type
Doc. Type (shortened) Pages Sites
(none) 1,818,595 (5.9%) 56,985 (25.6%)
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" 721,884 (2.3%) 18,648 (8.4%)
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" 385,656 (1.2%) 11,566 (5.2%)
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN" 22,019 (<0.1%) 1,175 (0.5%)
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN" 10,839 (<0.1%) 927 (0.4%)
All 3,046,449 (9.6%) 71,597 (32.2%)
shows the most frequently used document types that force all the browsers into quirks
mode, which includes the absence of a document type declaration in the page.
To test how often Internet Explorer allows a page’s document type to be overrid-
den when loading it in an iframe, we created another controlled experiment using
a local attack page framing the victim page, as outlined in Section 5.3.3. Using In-
ternet Explorer 11, we loaded our local attack page for each unique document type
inside the frame, and tested if the injected CSS was parsed. While Internet Explorer
parsed the injected CSS for 1,319 (30.5%) of the document types in the default set-
ting, the frame override trick caused CSS parsing for 4,248 (98.4%) of the unique
document types.
While over one thousand document types result in quirks mode, and around three
thousand document types cause standards mode parsing, the number of document
types that have been standardized is several orders of magnitude smaller. In fact,
only a few (standardized) document types are used frequently in pages, whereas
the majority of unique document types are used very rarely. Figure 5.4 shows that
only about ten standards and quirks mode document types are widely used in sites.
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Figure 5.4: Number of sites containing at least one page with a certain document
type (ordered by doctype rank).
Furthermore, only about 9.6% of pages in the candidate set use a quirks mode
document type; on the remaining pages, potential RPO style injection vulnerabilities
cannot be exploited because the CSS would not be parsed (unless Internet Explorer
is used). However, when grouping pages in the candidate set by site, 32.2% of sites
contain at least one page rendered in quirks mode (Table 5.7), which is one of the
preconditions for successful RPO.
5.4.3.2 Internet Explorer Framing
We showed above that by loading a page in a frame, Internet Explorer can be forced
to disregard a standards mode document type that would prevent interpretation of
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Table 5.7: Summary of document type usage in sites
Doc. Type At Least One Page All Pages
None 56,985 (25.6%) 19,968 (9.0%)
Quirks 27,794 (12.5%) 7,720 (3.5%)
None or Quirks 71,597 (32.2%) 30,040 (13.5%)
Standards 192,403 (86.5%) 150,846 (67.8%)
injected style. To find out how often this technique can be applied for successful
RPO attacks, we replicated our Chrome experiment in Internet Explorer, this time
loading each vulnerable page inside a frame. Around 14.5% of vulnerable pages were
exploitable in Internet Explorer, five times more than in Chrome (1.6% of the sites
in the candidate set as shown in Table 5.4).
Figure 5.2 shows the combined exploitability results for Chrome and Internet
Explorer according to the rank of the site. While our methodology did not find
any exploitable vulnerability on the six highest-ranked sites in the candidate set,
between 1.6% and 3.2% of candidate sites in each remaining bucket were found to
be exploitable. The highest exploitability rate occurred in the ranks 1 k through 10 k.
Broken down by injection technique, the framing trick in Internet Explorer results
in more exploitable pages for each technique except for cookie injection (Table 5.4).
One possible explanation for this difference is that the Internet Explorer crawl was
conducted one month after the Chrome crawl, and sites may have changed in the
meantime. Furthermore, we observed two additional impediments to successful ex-
ploitation in Internet Explorer that do not apply to Chrome. The framing technique
is susceptible to frame-busting methods employed by the framed pages, and Internet
Explorer implements an anti-MIME-sniffing header that Chrome appears to ignore.
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We analyze these issues below.
5.4.3.3 Anti-Framing Techniques
Some sites use a range of techniques to prevent other pages from loading them in
a frame [105]. One of these techniques is the X-Frame-Options header. It accepts
three different values: DENY, SAMEORIGIN, and ALLOW-FROM followed by a whitelist of
URLs.
In the vulnerable dataset, 4,999 pages across 391 sites use this header correctly
and as a result prevent the attack. However, 1,900 pages across 34 sites provide
incorrect values for this header, and we successfully attack 552 pages on 2 sites with
Internet Explorer.
A related technique is the frame-ancestors directive provided by Content Se-
curity Policy. It defines a (potentially empty) whitelist of URLs allowed to load the
current page in a frame, similar to ALLOW-FROM. However, it is not supported by
Internet Explorer, thus it cannot be used to prevent the attack.
Furthermore, developers may use JavaScript code to prevent framing of a page.
Yet, techniques exist to bypass this protection [95]. In addition, the attacker can use
the HTML 5 sandbox attribute in the iframe tag and omit the allow-top-navigation
directive to render JavaScript frame-busting code ineffective. However, we did not
implement any of these techniques to allow framing, which means that more vulner-
able pages could likely be exploited in practice.
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5.4.3.4 MIME Sniffing
A consequence of self-reference in the type of RPO studied in this paper is that the
HTTP content type of the fake “stylesheet” is text/html rather than the expected
text/css. Because many sites contain misconfigured content types, many browsers
attempt to infer the type based on the request context or file extension (MIME
sniffing), especially in quirks mode. In order to ask the browser to disable content
sniffing and refuse interpreting data with an unexpected or wrong type, sites can set
the header X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff [14, 60, 83].
To determine whether the injected CSS is still being parsed and executed in pres-
ence of this header while the browser renders in quirks mode, we ran an experiment
similar to Section 5.4.3.1. For each browser in Table 5.5, we extracted the document
types in which the browser renders in quirks mode, and for each of them, we set up a
local page with a relative stylesheet path. We then opened the page in the browser,
launched an RPO attack, and monitored if the injected CSS was executed.
Only Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Edge respected this header and did not inter-
pret injected CSS in any of the quirks mode document types. The remaining browsers
did not block the stylesheet even though the content type was not text/css. With
an additional experiment, we confirmed that Internet Explorer blocked our injected
CSS payload when nosniff was set, even in the case of the framing technique.
Out of all the vulnerable pages, 96,618 pages across 232 sites had a nosniff
response header; 23 pages across 10 sites were confirmed exploitable in Chrome but
not in Internet Explorer, since the latter browser respects the header while the former
does not.
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5.4.4 Content Management Systems
While analyzing the exploitable pages in our dataset, we noticed that many appeared
to belong to well-known CMSes. Since these web applications are typically installed
on thousands of sites, fixing RPO weaknesses in these applications could have a large
impact.
To identify CMSes, we visited all exploitable pages using Wappalyzer [122]. Ad-
ditionally, we detected two CMSes that were not supported by Wappalyzer. Overall,
we identified 23 CMSes on 41,288 pages across 1,589 sites. Afterwards, we manu-
ally investigated whether the RPO weakness stemmed from the CMS by installing
the latest version of each CMS (or using the online demo), and testing whether ex-
ploitable paths found in our dataset were also exploitable in the CMS. After careful
analysis, we confirmed four CMSes to be exploitable in their most recent version that
are being used by 40,255 pages across 1,197 sites.
Out of the four exploitable CMSes, one declares no document type and one uses a
quirks mode document type. These two CMSes can be exploited in Chrome, whereas
the remaining two can be exploited with the framing trick in Internet Explorer.
Beyond the view of our Common Crawl candidate set, Wappalyzer detected nearly
32 k installations of these CMSes across the Internet, which suggests that many more
sites could be attacked with RPO. We reported the RPO weaknesses to the vendors
of these CMSes using recommended notification techniques [70, 112, 21]. Thus far,
we heard back from one of the vendors, who acknowledged the vulnerability and are
going to take the necessary steps to fix the issue. However, we have not received any
response from the other vendors.
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5.4.5 Mitigation Techniques
Relative path overwrites rely on the web server and the web browser interpreting
URLs differently. HTML pages can use only absolute (or root-relative) URLs, which
removes the need for the web browser to expand relative paths. Alternatively, when
the HTML page contains a <base> tag, browsers are expected to use the URL
provided therein to expand relative paths instead of interpreting the current doc-
ument’s URL. Both methods can remove ambiguities and render RPO impossible
if applied correctly. Specifically, base URLs must be set according to the server’s
content routing logic. If developers choose to calculate base URLs dynamically on
the server side rather than setting them manually to constant values, there is a risk
that routing-agnostic algorithms could be confused by manipulated URLs and re-
introduce attack opportunities by instructing browsers to use an attacker-controlled
base URL. Furthermore, Internet Explorer does not appear to implement this tag
correctly.
Web developers can reduce the attack surface of their sites by eliminating any
injection sinks for strings that could be interpreted as a style directive. However,
doing so is challenging because in the attack presented in this paper, style injection
does not require a specific sink type and does not need the ability of injecting markup.
Injection can be accomplished with relatively commonly used characters, that is,
alphanumeric characters and (){}/". Experience has shown that despite years of
efforts, even context-sensitive and more special character-intensive XSS injection
is still possible in many sites, which leads us to believe that style injection will
be similarly difficult to eradicate. Even when all special characters in user input
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are replaced by their corresponding HTML entities and direct style injection is not
possible, more targeted RPO attack variants referencing existing files may still be
feasible. For instance, it has been shown that user uploads of seemingly benign
profile pictures can be used as “scripts” (or stylesheets) [116].
Instead of preventing RPO and style injection vulnerabilities, the most promising
approach could be to avoid exploitation. In fact, declaring a modern document type
that causes the HTML document to be rendered in standards mode makes the attack
fail in all browsers except for Internet Explorer. Web developers can harden their
pages against the frame-override technique in Internet Explorer by using commonly
recommended HTTP headers: X-Content-Type-Options to disable “content type
sniffing” and always use the MIME type sent by the server (which must be con-
figured correctly), X-Frame-Options to disallow loading the page in a frame, and
X-UA-Compatible to turn off Internet Explorer’s compatibility view.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we showed that over 5% of sites in the intersection of the Common
Crawl and the Alexa Top 1M are vulnerable to at least one injection technique.
While the number of exploitable sites depends on the browser and is much smaller in
relative terms, it is still consequential in absolute terms with thousands of affected
sites. RPO is a class of attacks, and our automated crawler tested for only a subset
of conceivable attacks. Therefore, the results of our study should be seen as a lower
bound; the true number of exploitable sites is likely higher.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, I developed three systems to measure and reduce the security risks of
content inclusions for website publishers as well as their users. More importantly, our
novel techniques are complementary to the existing defenses and users can browse
websites with a higher confidence.
In chapter 3, we presented Excision as a complementary system to other de-
fensive approaches such as CSP and Google Safe Browsing. Excision incrementally
constructs an inclusion tree for a given web page and automatically prevents loading
malicious resources by classifying their inclusion sequences using a set of pre-built
models. Excision detected a significant number of malicious third-party content in
the wild and was also able to detect previously unknown malicious inclusions while
not impacting users’ browsing experience negatively.
In chapter 4, we introduced fine-grained web content provenance tracking and
demonstrated its use for identifying unwanted third-party content (e.g., injected ad-
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vertisements) through OriginTracer, our prototype implementation. Due to the
highly interconnected structure of the web and the oftentimes obscure nature of its
trust relationships, we believe that surfacing this information in the form of proven-
ance is a generally useful capability, and can be applied in other novel ways in order
to lead to safer and more informed web browsing. Our evaluation suggests that Ori-
ginTracer can be used as a complementary system to ad blocking systems such as
AdblockPlus [2] and Ghostery [5].
In chapter 5, we presented a systematic study of style injection by relative path
overwrite (RPO) in the wild. We discussed a range of factors that prevent a vul-
nerability from being exploited, and found that simple countermeasures exist to
mitigate RPO. We also linked many exploitable pages to installations of Content
Management Systems (CMSes), and notified the vendors. Compared to XSS, it is
much more challenging to avoid injection of style directives. Yet, developers have
at their disposal a range of simple mitigation techniques that can prevent their sites
from being exploited in web browsers.
6.1 Publications
This thesis is written based on the following three published papers:
• Chapter 3: Sajjad Arshad, Amin Kharraz, William Robertson, Include Me
Out: In-Browser Detection of Malicious Third-Party Content Inclusions, Fin-
ancial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), 2016 1
1https://github.com/sajjadium/Excision
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• Chapter 4: Sajjad Arshad, Amin Kharraz, William Robertson, Identifying
Extension-based Ad Injection via Fine-grained Web Content Provenance, Re-
search in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID), 2016 2
• Chapter 5: Sajjad Arshad, Seyed Ali Mirheidari, Tobias Lauinger, Bruno
Crispo, Engin Kirda, William Robertson, Large-Scale Analysis of Style Injec-
tion by Relative Path Overwrite, The Web Conference (WWW), 2018
Our inclusion tree crawler has also been evolving, called DeepCrawling3, and was
utilized in topics such as tracking and privacy, and web security:
• Muhammad Ahmad Bashir, Sajjad Arshad, William Robertson, Christo Wilson,
Tracing Information Flows Between Ad Exchanges Using Retargeted Ads, USENIX
Security Symposium, 2016 4
• Muhammad Ahmad Bashir, Sajjad Arshad, Christo Wilson, Recommended
For You: A First Look at Content Recommendation Networks, ACM Internet
Measurement Conference (IMC), 2016 5
• Tobias Lauinger, Abdelberi Chaabane, Sajjad Arshad, William Robertson,
Christo Wilson, Engin Kirda, Thou Shalt Not Depend on Me: Analysing the
Use of Outdated JavaScript Libraries on the Web, Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2017 6
2https://github.com/sajjadium/OriginTracer
3https://github.com/sajjadium/DeepCrawling
4http://personalization.ccs.neu.edu/Projects/Retargeting/
5http://personalization.ccs.neu.edu/Projects/Recommended/
6https://seclab.ccs.neu.edu/static/projects/javascript-libraries/
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• Muhammad Ahmad Bashir, Sajjad Arshad, Engin Kirda, William Robertson,
Christo Wilson, How Tracking Companies Circumvented Ad Blockers Using
WebSockets, ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), 2018
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